










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/19916 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Beuzekom, Martie van 
Title: Latent risk factors in operating theatres and intensive care units 
Issue Date: 2012-10-02 







Latent Risk Factors in O






































































Cover by Peer Mascini 
Printed by Mostert & van Onderen, Leiden 
ISBN: 978-94-90858-13-1 
 
Copyright: © 2012, M. van Beuzekom, Leiden, The Netherlands 
Exceptions:  Chapter 2,6 © Oxford Journals 
Chapter 3 © BMJ Journals 
All rights reserved. No part of this thesis may be reproduced or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior written 

































Cover by Peer Mascini 
Printed by Mostert & van Onderen, Leiden 
ISBN: 978-94-90858-13-1 
 
Copyright: © 2012, M. van Beuzekom, Leiden, The Netherlands 
Exceptions:  Chapter 2,6 © Oxford Journals 
Chapter 3 © BMJ Journals 
All rights reserved. No part of this thesis may be reproduced or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior written 





















ter verkrijging van 
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, 
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. P.F. van der Heijden, 
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties 
te verdedigen op dinsdag 2 oktober 2012 








Martie van Beuzekom 





Promotor:    Prof.dr. A. Dahan 
 
Co-promotores:   Dr. F. Boer 
  Dr. S.P. Akerboom 
 
Overige leden:   Prof.dr. L.P.H.J. Aarts 
Prof.dr. J. Damen, Radboud University 
Nijmegen Medical Centre 
  Prof.dr. F.W. Jansen 
  Prof.dr. E. de Jonge 
  Prof.dr. J. Kievit 







Promotor:    Prof.dr. A. Dahan 
 
Co-promotores:   Dr. F. Boer 
  Dr. S.P. Akerboom 
 
Overige leden:   Prof.dr. L.P.H.J. Aarts 
Prof.dr. J. Damen, Radboud University 
Nijmegen Medical Centre 
  Prof.dr. F.W. Jansen 
  Prof.dr. E. de Jonge 
  Prof.dr. J. Kievit 





The operation of a health service depends upon a complex 
interaction between the patient, the environment in which care is 
provided and the people, equipment and facilities that deliver the 
care. 
Sir Liam Donaldson writing in Medical Mishaps: Pieces of the 
Puzzle. Rosenthal M M, Mulcahy L and Lloyd-Bostock S (Eds). Open 














Voor degenen die mij inspireerden 











Chapter 1  Introduction and Outline of this Thesis  9 
 
Chapter 2  Patient safety: Latent Risk Factors 19 
 
Chapter 3  Assessing system failures in  
Operating Rooms and Intensive Care Units 29 
 
Chapter 4  Patient safety in the Operating Room:  
an intervention study on Latent Risk Factors 37 
 
Chapter 5  Influence of Latent Risk Factors on  
job satisfaction, job stress and intention to leave  
in anaesthesia teams: a cross-sectional survey 49 
 
Chapter 6  Perception of patient safety differs by clinical area   
and disciplines 69 
 
Chapter 7  Summary and conclusions 93 
 
Chapter 8  Samenvatting en conclusies 99 
  
 Curriculum Vitae 105 
 














Patient safety has become a major concern in healthcare. But how much 
of a problem is patient safety? The unsettling fact is that no one knows. 
What we ‘‘know’’ depends on how we gather information and on how we 
determine that a patient has been injured by an error.  Not all errors and 
incidents leading to injury or damage are systematically recorded; 
obtaining a reliable estimate of errors is difficult.  
 
Two questions therefore arise. How can systematic action be taken to 
avert preventable errors? In particular, how can we identify and prioritize 
remedial actions?   
In accidents and injuries in other hazardous industries, such as aviation 
and nuclear power industry it was possible to reduce accidents and 
injuries by the application of lessons from cognitive psychology and 
human factors. The report:  “To err is human: Building a Safer Health 
System”, from the Institute of Medicine also shed a new light on the 
causes of medical error.1  According to this report and other studies 
conducted around the globe, approximately 10% of all patients admitted 
to hospital suffer some kind of harm, about half of which is preventable 
with current standards of treatment.2-5 
The focus of this thesis is on the Operating Theatre (OT) and Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU). Both are dynamic environments, with constant change 
and time stress in which a wide variety of high-technology equipment is 
used. These areas are known to have a high incidence of errors and 
negative outcomes. 6-8 
Errors occur where the work is done, where practitioners interact directly 
with the system in their roles as anaesthesiologists, surgeons, and 
nurses. Those events emerge from a chain of failures elsewhere in the 
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the Swiss cheese model, errors and serious adverse events are often 
preceded by a chain of individually unimportant errors and problems, in 
turn influenced by a wide variety of contributory factors.9 
 
How medical errors occur, how they can be addressed within the health 
care system and how the work environment provokes errors re topics of 
particular interest.  Deficiencies at many different levels in the 
organization create the context in which human error can have a negative 
impact.  As an illustration we distinguish three levels at which errors 
occur (figure 1). 
The highest level is personal errors.  Personal it refers to the individual 
skills of the professional. Such human errors can be classified as 
knowledge-based, rule-based or skill-based and imply a specific deficit in 
an individual’s knowledge, ability to apply procedures or specific technical 
skills.10 For a long time a person-centred analysis and prevention 
approach has been dominant in proposals to improve patient safety in 
health care. In this approach the focus is on the ever-present ‘human 
factor’, concentrating on the individual responsible for making an error. 
The person-centred approach tends to concentrate on individual failure, 
with individual consequences, such as retraining, coaching, working under 
supervision and at worst punishing the employee. This approach rarely 
improves the behaviour of the group, leads to concealment of errors and 
cover-up. The end result is that safety does not improve. 
 
At the next level are errors of team performance. The interprofessional 
team setting is one in which lack of broad oversight and understanding of 
individual functions is a core problem. In the OT team, team members 
often do not fully understand where everyone’s work fits into the whole 
process. Moreover, nurses do not tend to work consistently with the same 
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anaesthesiologist, surgeon and team, and their rotating assignment may 
(further) reduce understanding of system processes as they relate to 
particular services and procedures. Surgeons and anaesthesiologists 
division of labor also undermines the identification of safety issues and 
solutions as well as the identification of problematic practice routines in 
everyday work. 11 ICU team members have divergent perceptions of their 
communication behaviors, with more nurses than doctors reporting 
difficulties in speaking-up about problems with patient care.12 Recognition 
of problems in team performance in aviation led to the development of 
training programs in team coordination, leadership and decision making 
known generically as Crew Resource Management. CRM is currently 
introduced in anesthesia and surgery.13 
 
The lowest level at which errors can occur are the preconditions. Because 
they are not directly visible in the working environment they are 
described as Latent Risk Factors (LRFs). LRFs are usually identified in the 
analysis of accidents and incidents and therefore also described as 
general failures types.14 Generally, a single underlying failure will be 
compensated for. It is when multiple factors come together that an 
incident becomes increasingly likely, as expressed in Reason's Swiss 
cheese model.9 The model assumes that if errors occur, several 
simultaneous failures must have occurred within the organization.  Error-
producing conditions are poor design, maintenance failures, unworkable 
procedures, deficiencies in training, equipment design and use as well as 
poor team coordination. 
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Figure 1 
 
As a result of the recognition of the fact that individuals evoke incidents 
(the sharp edge), within an error predisposed environment (the blunt 
edge), a different approach to errors was developed. The  alternative  to 
the person centered approach to errors is the systems approach which 
focuses on the conditions under which individuals work rather than on 
errors by individuals.9 This approach assumes that the work environment 
can shape behavior and can make certain kinds of errors less or more 
likely. Bringing the systems approach into medical practice clearly entails 
a fundamental shift in thinking about error and handling error in practice 
and required a comprehensive strategy for change. While most attempts 
to improve safety in health care are reactive, responding after someone is 
harmed; efforts to proactively identify and eliminate hazards have the 
potential to significantly and systematically improve safety.  
A proactive safety management system, designed to measure and reduce 
the adverse impact of LRFs within an organization, may provide the 
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answer. Proactive systems work in part by asking people to judge how 
frequently each of a number of factors such as training, equipment, 
procedures and communication impacts adversely on specific aspects of 
their work. This type of proactive approach allows the identification of 
LRFs before they give rise to errors that can compromise patient safety. 
Such a system may serve not only to reduce error, but also to foster a 
culture that, by moving away from blaming the individual and encourages 
reporting. This thesis describes a method for a proactive system 
approach. 
Outline of this thesis 
The hypothesis that correcting LRFs and concentrating on systemic rather 
than individual issues in patient safety will result in safer care was the 
cornerstone of the Leiden Operating Theatre Safety (LOTS) project. 
 
The studies presented in this thesis aimed at answering the following 
questions: 
1. Are the LRFs measured valid and reliable by the Leiden Operating 
Theatre and Intensive Care Safety (LOTICS) scale? 
2. Has an intervention based on a safety program an effect on the LRFs: 
material, staffing resources and training? 
3. Is there a relationship between LRFs and job satisfaction, job stress 
and intention to leave in anaesthesia teams? 
4. Is there a difference in perception on LRFs between clinical area (OT 
vs. ICU) and disciplines? 
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of accident theories and of LRFs. Accident 
theories are frameworks to study accidents. LRFs exist within the systems 
analysis theory. These LRFs describe the total working environment as 
they emerged from the analysis of accidents. They have been identified 
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through a combination of factor analysis of questionnaire data and logical 
analysis adapted from the original structure developed for oil and gas. 
 
Chapter 3 reports details of the development and the psychometric 
properties of the Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Safety 
(LOTICS) scale. The scale assesses the state of the individual LRFs 
through a questionnaire of personnel working within the Operating 
Theatre and the Intensive Care Unit. The questionnaire is analogous to a 
health check, assessing a limited number of well-chosen diagnostic vital 
signs 
Chapter 4 describes a prospective study, concerned with the question 
whether an intervention leads to improvement on LRFs. It was 
anticipated that addressing specific LRFs, rather than just a general 
awareness campaign, will contribute to the prevention of future errors 
and consequently to improved patient outcomes. It describes the 
implementation of a patient safety program in the Operating Theatre. 
Chapter 5 emphasizes the causal relationship between working conditions 
and the delivery of quality of clinical care. It was determined that LRFs, 
which enhance patient safety, can have a positive effect on the well-
being of specialist anaesthetists, trainees in anaesthesia and nurse 
anaesthetists. 
Chapter 6 explores the influence of the clinical area (Operating Theatre 
and Intensive Care Unit) and disciplines on rating of LRFs. Identification 
of differences between clinical areas or disciplines would allow tailoring 
the measures directed at LRFs that are below standard. Tailoring is 
necessary because correction of the various LRFs would require entirely 
different preventive actions. Obtaining input from all workers in the 
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clinical areas guarantees that a broader spectrum of LRFs will be 
addressed, since each discipline has its focus for LRFs. 
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Key points
† The system approach
focuses on working
conditions rather than on
errors of individuals.
† This approach assumes




† The factors that promote
errors are described as
LRFs.
† Understanding how LRFs
affect safety can enable us
to design more effective
control measures.
Summary. The person-centred analysis and prevention approach has long dominated
proposals to improve patient safety in healthcare. In this approach, the focus is on the
individual responsible for making an error. An alternative is the systems-centred
approach, in which attention is paid to the organizational factors that create precursors
for individual errors. This approach assumes that since humans are fallible, systems
must be designed to prevent humans from making errors or to be tolerant to those
errors. The questions raised by this approach might, for example, include asking why an
individual had specific gaps in their knowledge, experience, or ability. The systems
approach focuses on working conditions rather than on errors of individuals, as the
likelihood of specific errors increases with unfavourable conditions. Since the factors
that promote errors are not directly visible in the working environment, they are
described as latent risk factors (LRFs). Safety failures in anaesthesia, in particular, and
medicine, in general, result from multiple unfavourable LRFs, so we propose that
effective interventions require that attention is paid to interactions between multiple
factors and actors. Understanding how LRFs affect safety can enable us to design more
effective control measures that will impact significantly on both individual performance
and patient outcomes.
Keywords: medical errors; quality assurance, health care; risk management; safety
Patient safety has become a major concern in the health-
care system. Two questions therefore arise. How can
systematic action be taken to avert preventable errors? In par-
ticular, how can we identify and prioritize remedial actions?
For a long time, a person-centred analysis and prevention
approach has dominated proposals to improve patient safety
inhealthcare. In this approach, the focus is on theever-present
‘human factor’, concentrated on the individual responsible for
making an error. Such human errors can be classified as
knowledge-based, rule-based, or skill-based1 and imply
specific deficits in an individual’s knowledge, ability to apply
procedures, or specific technical skills, respectively. As a
result of this vision, solutions typically involve (re-)training,
extra supervision, and evendisciplinaryactions applied to indi-
vidual doctors and nurses. An alternative is the
systems-centred approach,2 in which attention is paid to the
organizational factors that create the precursors for those
individual errors. The questions raised by this approach
might include asking why an individual had such specific
gaps in their knowledge, experience, or ability. Anaesthetists
havemade significant advances in patient safety through sys-
tematic incident monitoring and analysis, paying attention to
the design and ergonomic aspects of equipment, implement-
ing safety devices, and considering fatigue and cognitive over-
load.3 4 Despite this growing recognition of the role of human
error in anaesthesia, it still remains unclear what should best
be done to mitigate its effects5 and how its occurrence can
best be prevented or mitigated in the first place. The problem
is that solutions are often proposed as a result of the most
recent analyses or the introduction of new technologies,
neither of which may tackle the problems that are the most
pressing in a wider context.
The systems-centred approach assumes that humans are
fallible and that systems must be designed so that humans
are prevented from making errors. An example is the pin
index for connections of gas cylinders that prevents erro-
neous connections, removing the possibility of error.
Human performance involves a complex interaction of
factors, including the inseparable tie between individuals,
their equipment, and their general working environment.
Where the environment is one that makes errors by individ-
uals more likely, we can identify the underlying problems
that will have been present in the system, often recognized
but long tolerated. The factors that make errors more likely,
or more dangerous, can be characterized as latent risk
factors (LRFs). Generally, a single underlying failure will
be compensated for. It is when multiple factors come
together that an incident becomes increasingly likely, as
expressed in Reason’s Swiss cheese model.6 It is important
to understand why a highly trained individual can commit
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an error and how events and conditions coincided to permit
it. Understanding how and which LRFs affect safety should
enable us to design more effective control measures that
will impact significantly on both individual performance
and patient outcomes.7
Accident theories
High-risk systems, which are typical of our technologically
complex era, include not only nuclear power plants and com-
mercial aviation, but also hospitals and anaesthesia systems,
and the practice of medicine. An analysis of many different
technological systems shows how certain general character-
istics can make systems either inherently safer or inherently
more dangerous.8 In high-risk systems, no matter how effec-
tive safety devices are, some types of accidents are often
seen as inevitable because the system’s complexity leads
to multiple and unexpected interactions.9 Perrow’s Normal
Accident Theory10 proposes that certain types of accident
will happen regardless of the number of safety devices.
Perrow characterized systems according to two important
dimensions: interaction and tight or loose coupling. A task
or process is said to have complex interaction if there are
many alternative and interrelated subtasks at any point in
its completion. Complex interaction reflects high levels of
specialization and interdependency among their various
components and creates opacity to those within the
system. The coupling dimension describes the extent to
which an action in the task or process is related to its conse-
quences. A system is tightly coupled if serious and unrecover-
able consequences are likely to occur immediately after a
mistake is made—hence, tightly coupled systems are unfor-
giving, and at high risk for accidents, and must therefore be
made more reliable. The pace of recent development
suggests that the practice of hospital medicine, and
especially the operating theatre (OT), is becoming both
more complex and more tightly coupled, thus both more
opaque and less forgiving when things go wrong.
Reason’s Swiss cheese model2 was originally developed
for domains such as oil and gas, aviation, railways, and
nuclear power generation. It revolutionized accident investi-
gation worldwide and has since gained widespread accep-
tance and use in healthcare.11 This model has the
advantage of explaining why accidents are so rare, even in
high-risk activities. High technology systems have many
defensive layers: some are engineered (alarms, physical bar-
riers, automatic shutdowns, etc.), others rely on skilled indi-
viduals (anaesthetists, surgeons, pilots, control room
operators, etc.), and yet others depend on procedures and
administrative controls. The model assumes that if errors
occur, several simultaneous failures must have occurred
within the organization. Although adverse events occur
where the work is done, where practitioners interact directly
with the system in their roles as anaesthesiologists, sur-
geons, and nurses, those events emerge from a chain of fail-
ures elsewhere in the organization, from conditions that are
not directly visible. According to the model, serious adverse
events and complications are often preceded by a chain
of individually unimportant errors and problems, in turn
influenced by a wide variety of contributory factors.2 To
investigate errors proactively, using the concepts of the
Swiss cheese model, various groups have developed a
variety of tools and approaches. The Tripod-Delta (Diagnostic
Evaluation Tool for Accident prevention) tool is a checklist-
based approach to carrying out ‘safety health’ checks.12
The four levels of the Human Factors Analysis and Classifi-
cation System (HFACS) have been applied to aviation13 and
to cardiovascular surgery.14 HFACS can also be applied to
help understand the interplay of human factors in the OT
environment and the organizational context.15 Others have
argued for ‘a systems approach to surgical safety’,16
suggesting that it is necessary to study all aspects of the
system that comprises a surgical operation, including such
issues as equipment design and use, communication, team
coordination, factors affecting individual performance, and
the working environment.
Both Normal Accident Theory and the Swiss cheese model
direct attention to systemic issues but do not, of themselves,
provide a structure of underlying factors that can serve as a
taxonomy of causes. Such a taxonomy is required to diag-
nose why accidents are occurring and to support prioritiza-
tion of remedial actions in ways that go beyond the purely
symptomatic. The next section describes such a list, specifi-
cally developed for the OT and anaesthetic practice, but
based upon the Tripod-Delta methodology developed for
the Swiss cheese model.
Latent risk factors
Analyses of major disasters, ship accidents, accidents in the
exploration and production of oil and gas, railway operations,
and aviation have shown that the contributing causes that
occur in all these accidents can be captured with a limited
classification system. These underlying latent causes can
be categorized into a limited number of classes: LRFs.17 18
The choice of a particular taxonomic structure is driven by
the need to capture all types of potential causes together
with the need to identify where in the organization remedial
actions can be put in place. These LRFs describe the total
working environment, the setting in which accidents and
incidents occur. The LRFs identified in the OT environment19
are listed in Table 1 and described in further detail below.
They have been identified through a combination of factor
analysis of questionnaire data and logical analysis adapted
from the original structure developed for oil and gas.2 12 16 17
Each of the 10 factors is prefaced with a short description rel-
evant to anaesthetic practice, although most are equally
applicable in the wider hospital setting.
Equipment, design, and maintenance
By the late 1980s, a number of articles featuring human
factor concepts and applications could be found in the litera-
ture, many of which dealt with anaesthesia equipment.4 20
This factor covers the broad design of equipment, including













documentation and hardware, its manufacture, and main-
tenance. Equipment may be hard to use because of lack of
attention to basic ergonomic considerations; it may break
down either because of poor manufacturing standards or
because it has not been maintained at all or maintained
incorrectly.11 Individuals may feel forced to apply some
form of work-around that may increase greatly the chance
of errors. New equipment, even when well designed and
manufactured, tends to add to the complexity, opacity, and
unfamiliarity of a situation.21–24 It is not uncommon for
medical staff to spend a large amount of time looking for
charts and equipment; variations in equipment and lack of
training in how to use it also increase the likelihood of
error.25 This LRF captures how even the best equipment
can be problematical when it is not fit for purpose in the
wider context of procurement, training, procedures, and
maintenance practices.
Staffing
Adequate staffing is fundamental to quality care. The staff are
often the last layer of defence for error occurrence, and under-
staffing and inadequate skill mix are threats to patient safety
in the OT.26 27 There is little published work examining the
relationship between workload and either quality or safety
of anaesthetic care,23 but a survey by Singer and colleagues28
found that 49% of respondents had witnessed production
pressure resulting in what they believed to be unsafe
actions by an anaesthesiologist. High rates of staff turnover
degrade the collective experience in the OT to the point that
educators of new staff are themselves relatively inexperi-
enced.14 Understaffing is one of the greatest threats to
patient safety, but rapid turnover can be another.
Communication
Failures of communication between OT personnel are
common.29 30 This may involve communicating too little
or even too much, too early or too late, and may involve a
failure of either the person initiating the communication
or the receiver, who may fail to understand or even hear
the message. Most surgical errors are not attributable to
an individual but involve multiple personnel and steps;
43% of such errors are thought to be due to poor communi-
cation.31 There is evidence from a variety of sources that
communications between members of health-care teams
emerge as a key factor in poor care and are especially
apparent where medical errors occur. Lingard and col-
leagues29 took this as their starting point for an observa-
tional study of communication failures in OTs. They found
that 31% of all communications could be categorized as a
failure in some way: the information was missing, the
timing was poor, there were unresolved issues, or key
people were absent.32
Training
Lack of training and experience is often mentioned as
sources of medical errors. In a study of surgical errors
leading to malpractice claims, Rogers and colleagues33
found that the leading causes (41%) were lack of experience
and lack of technical competence. This study should be inter-
preted with some caution as it concerned accepted closed
claims that were therefore possibly selected on the basis of
liable causes. Training has been shown to decrease error
and increase the ability to solve problems, particularly for
inexperienced professionals.34 35 The concept of simulation
as an educational tool in healthcare is not a new idea, but
its use has blossomed over the last few years. It has been
most widely studied in anaesthesia. In 1992, Chopra and
colleagues36 reported that the performance of anaesthesiol-
ogists who trained on the simulator was superior to those
subjects who did not receive such training. The recent
enthusiasm for simulator-based training is partly driven by
an attempt to increase patient safety and also because the
technology is becoming more affordable and advanced.37
38 Concerns about patient safety are leading to changes in
educational methods. Simulation now plays a major role in
training efforts designed to foster the acquisition of new
skills and knowledge outside the clinical environment.39
Failure of training is often attributed as a major cause of
incidents, implying a lack of competence in the person.
This LRF is intended to catch the system-based failures,
such as lack of needs analysis, failure to train at all, use of
appropriate vs inappropriate training methods for the skill
required, failure to assess the results of training, and
lack of consideration for alternatives to person-based
approaches. For instance, good design reduces the need for
extensive training in the use of equipment, whereas poor
design may be only partially compensated for by extensive
training.
Table 1 Latent risk factors






Staffing Adequate staffing, skills
Communication Work-directed communication,
openness, interrelation, atmosphere





Procedures Presence of protocols, adherence to
protocols
Situational awareness Awareness of present situation, own
tasks, and future developments




















Teamwork and team training
The unintended consequences of clumsy automation, task
complexity, and excessive workloads on human performance
in high-risk patient environment have received much atten-
tion.40 During the 1980s and 1990s, publications on teams
in aviation appeared, documenting the belief that pilot per-
formance is directly influenced by the nature and quality of
the interactions among group members. The same is true
for doctors who operate in complex environments where
teams interact with technology. Much work pioneering
work on the impact of team behaviour, attitudes towards
safety, and professional culture on human performance in
medicine has come from the department of anaesthesia of
the University of Basel, Switzerland, starting in the
mid-1990s.41 42
Individual team members may be highly skilled in their
individual roles, but they are not necessarily trained in
working together as a team.43 Substantial discrepancies in
perceptions of teamwork exist in the OT with physicians
rating the teamwork of others as good, whereas at the
same time, nurses perceived the teamwork as poor.29 44–46
These findings mirror similar results of discrepant attitudes
about collaboration between physicians and nurses in inten-
sive care units (ICUs).47–50 A growing awareness of the
importance of team interactions of aviation crews lead to
the concept of Crew Resource Management (CRM) in the
1980s.51 Analogous training was developed by Gaba’s
group at Stanford (initially in anaesthesiology) and has
since enjoyed global spread in healthcare.52 CRM training
involves educating and training staff to use techniques that
enable individuals to communicate problems more effec-
tively, divide task responsibilities during high workload situ-
ations, and resolve conflicts in the cockpit.53 Crew training
is considered essential for everyone to learn, but its benefits
to individuals are difficult to measure if it then improves the
performance of all staff.54
Procedures: protocols
The presence of protocols is generally considered as helpful
to improve safety. Doctors and nurses often have opposing
views on protocol violation and hold different attitudes to
clinical work.55 In particular, nurses appear to hold more sys-
tematized and less individualistic conceptions of clinical work
than doctors. The results indicate that when best practice is
defined in the form of a written protocol, deviations from
these are more likely to be reported, at least by nurses.
This also suggests that health-care professionals are, in
general, reluctant to report behaviour that has negative con-
sequences for the patient when that behaviour reflects either
compliance with a protocol or improvisation where no proto-
col is in place.56 Reluctance to report non-compliances, even
when the outcome for the patient is bad, may be a function
of the widespread and well-documented resistance among
doctors to clinical protocols, perceived by many in the
medical community as a threat to their professional compe-
tence. Alternatively, reporting on colleagues may simply
reflect the professional culture. Part of the issue with proto-
cols in the clinical setting is due to cultural factors that will
be considered below, but there are also systemic issues
with protocols even when they are fully accepted. These
issues include the relevance, design, and accuracy of proto-
cols and whether the system is capable of continuously
amending protocols and ensuring that they are kept up to
date and whether they are accepted by those supposed to
use them.
Situational awareness
Situational awareness (SA) can be defined by three questions
‘Where have we come from? Where are we now? Where are
we going?’57 At best, in the OT, SA requires active involve-
ment in the progress of the operation by the anaesthesiolo-
gist, nursing, and surgical crews that make up the operating
team. Shared situation awareness refers to the degree to
which the team members have the same interpretation of
ongoing events.57 Surgical teams with the best outcomes
were not those who were error-free, but those who success-
fully compensated for the errors that had occurred.58 Good
SA can provide essential corrections to problems that may
arise as a result of complexity and tight coupling. SA allows
proactive intervention and can drive changes in priorities as
a result of changes in the patient, the OT environment, or
outside the OT. Although SA may be seen as a result rather
than a factor, it appears reliably as a distinct underlying
factor19 and is a skill that can be trained for.
Incompatible goals
All organizations must find a balance between their goals
and safety. To some extent, there will always be a trade-off
between safety and finance, because achieving the highest
feasible levels of safety will cost increasing amounts of
money that no organization can eventually afford to
pay.17 Incompatible goals may involve more than finance,
as any choice made under pressure may create situations
that are inappropriate. Incompatible goals can be regarded
as one of the most fundamental LRF, as all behaviour can
be seen as an adaptation to conflict situations, with
errors arising when the ‘incorrect’ choice is made. It is
not just the incompatibility of safety and finance. Safety
goals can even conflict with other safety goals, such as
when a requirement for a rapid unplanned surgical inter-
vention conflicts with the need to ensure that necessary
checks are carried out before proceeding. One of the prob-
lems associated with complexity is an increasing locality
of priorities. Anaesthetists, surgeons, nursing staff, and
administrators can all have different priorities that can
easily conflict.
Planning and organization
Donabedian59 observed in 1966 that the best outcomes
depend on good processes of care, which in turn depend
on the correct structures and organization being in place.
Hospitals cannot control for the severity of underlying













illness in patients, but they can ensure that their services are
effectively staffed and organized to manage those for whom
they care. For instance, changing the OT schedule overnight
often leads to confusion, resulting in late starts, the wrong
patient in the OT, and equipment and materials being una-
vailable. Since the operation programme is a coordinating
mechanism and changes are often not well communicated,
the lack of effective coordination results in errors and risks.
Hospitals try to decrease their risks by applying rules for pro-
gramme changes or better (electronic) communication
about changed programmes. This LRF captures the systemic
issues around having an organization that needs to be opti-
mized to support its clinical tasks rather than, for instance,
having clinical tasks altered to fit the demands of the organ-
ization. One particular issue that arises in hospitals is the dis-
parity in structures required for different specialities.
Housekeeping
Housekeeping refers generally to tidiness, but from experi-
ence means ‘a place for everything and everything in its
place’. Superficially, clean and tidy environments may in
fact cover a situation where everything is impossible to
find, again resulting in unsafe practices seen as necessary
to work around the shortcomings. In medical settings,
housekeeping naturally extends to hygiene and the support
and discipline required achieving levels compatible with
patient and staff safety. As the use of electronic devices
(i.e. mobile phones and personal digital assistants) has
become commonplace in the OT and ICU in recent years,
these devices are being increasingly used in close proximity
to the patients. A rate of 7% bacterial contamination with
potentially pathogenic bacteria was found on telephones
and intercoms in patient care areas.60 Housekeeping is a
critical test of the organization, and the NHS experience in
the UK suggests that this has been at least a part of many
important clinical problems such as Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Management may know
that there is a problem and does not act or they may not
even know that there is a problem.
Each one of these LRFs is the responsibility of the organiz-
ation rather than of individuals, which is why they form an
appropriate level of description for the system-based
approach, as opposed to the person approach that refers to
individual performance factors such as skill or vigilance. Indi-
vidual clinicians, no matter how capable, do not usually
define and test their own training, decide on staffing levels
or scheduling, set up and ensure that protocols are up to
date, fund equipment, or make sure that communication
issues are discovered and attended to. It is at this organiz-
ational systemic level that the preconditions for error, such
as haste, ignorance, and fatigue, are created and it as the
level of the LRF that the ‘disease’ can be best treated,
rather than relying upon a purely symptomatic and often
palliative approach directed at individuals found to have
failed when being hasty, ignorant, or fatigued. The question
that remains however is: how can these LRFs be identified,
measured, and managed in the hospital setting? Without
an adequate approach to providing answers to these
questions, the system-based approach remains an unachiev-
able vision.
The list of LRFs details the organizational, management,
and work environment factors in ways that make the identi-
fication of effective interventions easier. Systematic
approaches to improvement, taking small concrete interven-
tions rather than large sweeping initiatives, often impact
more effectively on the culture as successes are observed
in the working environment. Although effects on outcomes
may not always appear immediately, the development of a
virtuous circle may be expected to show gains relatively
rapidly.
Measuring the state of latent risk factors
Most incident analyses only describe ‘who’ was involved and
‘what’ occurred, with limited attention paid to the underlying
causes that can be captured systematically by LRFs. Although
the state of the individual LRFs could be assessed objectively,
their effect on workplace safety and patient safety is
unknown. Therefore, other techniques have been developed
in which the immediate effects on workers and accidents
have been studied, notably in the oil industry and aviation.
The most significant development in this area was the
development of the TRIPOD instruments. TRIPOD is the
name used originally by Shell International for what else-
where is known as the Swiss cheese model.12 61 TRIPOD is
based on deficiencies in the working situation labelled as
General Failure Types (GFTs),12 the equivalent to the LRFs dis-
cussed above. It provides an accident analysis method to
identify and classify problem areas into underlying causes,
scored as GFTs that led to the accident. The reactive under-
standing of how accidents happen described by TRIPOD led
to the development of a specific proactive instrument,
TRIPOD-Delta.62 The questionnaire is applied to workers
and is based on their experience in the workplace. Where
TRIPOD is retrospective, the TRIPOD-Delta instrument is pro-
spective. Prospective methods offer significant theoretical
advantages over retrospective methods. They do not rely
on an adverse event having occurred. They allow the identi-
fication of latent factors in the system that may lead to
hazards but that have yet to become manifested in incidents.
TRIPOD-Delta measures the ‘safety health’ of an organiz-
ation rather than waiting for accidents to happen or even
observing what actual unsafe acts people were performing.
The approach taken is analogous to a health check, asses-
sing a limited number of well-chosen diagnostic vital
signs.62 In the prospective survey, items can be either indi-
cators of either potential problems or good practice. Posses-
sing the former or lacking the latter can both be treated as
indications that there are latent failures present in a particu-
lar LRF and generate a negative score. Failure to find indi-
cations of problems and possession of the factors that are
evidence of good practice both contribute to a positive















score. The sum total of poor and good indicators can then be
represented as a standard score indicating whether there is a
serious problem or cause for relief. TRIPOD-Delta was devel-
oped by Leiden and Manchester Universities12 17 for the oil
and gas industry and concentrated on workplace safety
and lost hours due to incidents. An early version of this
approach was applied to a comparison of two intensive
care wards.63 In such cases, it is possible to show that differ-
ent units (wards, theatres, and hospitals) differ in their rela-
tive scores on LRFs, supporting the understanding that
effective solutions should reflect the pattern of scores
rather than having a ‘one size fits all’ approach.
The SWIFT technique is also a prospective approach. It is a
systematic team-oriented technique for hazard identification
adapted for healthcare and particularly suitable for environ-
ments where human and organizational factors predomi-
nate, such as the OT.64
We developed the Leiden Operating Theatre Intensive
Care Scale (LOTICS) as an instrument to detect the under-
lying causes of medical errors proactively19 by measuring
LRFs (Table 1). It shows the strengths and weakness of an
organization, allowing the possibility of data-driven interven-
tions. Changes in patient safety performance can then be
monitored and the effects of interventions to improve the
level of patient safety can be evaluated. Similarly, LOTICS
can be used for comparison of different organizations and
disciplines within the medical system.
The LRFs described here are broadly equivalent to the orig-
inal set of GFTs. The original set of GFTs was developed to
provide coverage of all the areas that might create problems,
not just technical or human, and to facilitate identification of
where remedial actions might best be applied. The LRF tax-
onomy used has been configured to provide a better
mapping onto the medical setting, and the OT in particular,
rather than a set originally designed for oil and gas
operations.
Culture
The system-based approach concentrates upon character-
istics and behaviours of the organization, just as the person-
based approach concentrates upon the characteristics and
behaviours of individuals. A number of recent major acci-
dents have highlighted the importance of the organizational
culture within which both of these are played out. British Pet-
roleum’s own analysis of the Texas City refinery disaster in
200565 and NASA’s analysis of the Columbia disaster66 both
stressed the importance of organizational culture. The
culture of an organization determines how the systemic
components are treated. A poor safety culture pays little
attention to what is seen as unnecessary and bureaucratic,
whereas a good safety culture takes the best out of what is
on offer. Poor cultures deny problems until they cannot be
ignored, attribute failure to personal shortcomings in individ-
uals, and are afraid to report, both on themselves and on
others. Good safety cultures, in contrast, accept accountabil-
ity, treat problems once identified as opportunities to learn,
understand that incidents have multiple causes, and search
actively for ways to improve.
The advanced safety culture has been characterized in a
number of domains under the label of High Reliability Organ-
izations (HROs). HROs theory is based on the belief that acci-
dents can be prevented through good organizational design
and management.67 It describes core principles of organiz-
ations that have few accidents despite operating in highly
dynamic, technologically rich, and hazardous industries.68
These were identified in diverse settings such as aircraft
carrier flight operations, air traffic control, and nuclear
power plant operation. They are characterized by a high
level of mindfulness, deference to specific expertise, regard-
less of an individual’s position in the hierarchy and a just and
fair culture in which people feel able to report errors by them-
selves and others. The problem in many areas is that the
organizational culture is nowhere near as advanced as an
HRO, even if people think they are close to attaining that
level of responsiveness to safety issues. There is a clear inter-
action between the organizational factors, defined in term of
the LRFs, and the culture, in that less advanced safety cul-
tures will have more identified issues and fewer implemen-
tations of good practices.
Discussion
Although the best measure of safety performance is not
clear other than in terms of patient outcomes, it is certainly
too multidimensional to put a single figure as a safety score.
It is also clear from studies elsewhere that single changes,
especially when performed without due regard for the total
context, are often ineffective and may even be detrimental.
One person’s improvement may be another’s LRF. Ideally,
safety should be embodied throughout the institution, part
of the culture, and minimizing possible latent causes that
might accidentally combine to produce injury. This continu-
ing search, improving with small incremental measures, is
very similar to the quality concept of continuing quality
improvements.69
Individual errors are personally attributable and it is
tempting to address these errors only, as there is a clear con-
nection between error and single agents who can be blamed.
Yet, this approach still does not solve the problem of recur-
rent erroneous behaviour. Such errors do not occur of them-
selves, but arise within the context of the work environment,
described by LRFs. There is a clear need to develop
approaches that allow organizations to measure in an
ongoing and prospective way the injuries that healthcare
causes.64
Tackling the LRFs will improve the overall safety condition
of the organization by reducing safety problems before they
arise,70 in particular if combined with explicit improvements
in the safety culture. We have argued here that systematic
analyses and step-by-step improvements are feasible and
can impact directly on the culture. The traditional fields of
practice, such as risk analysis, have so far been unable to
provide many effective or long-lasting solutions. There are













several reasons for this, the most important probably being
that they are based on oversimplified accident models.
Simple repair work will not mend the problem, because if
one part of the system is changed that may affect another
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Background: The current awareness of the potential safety risks in healthcare environments has led to the
development of largely reactive methods of systems analysis. Proactive methods are able to objectively detect
structural shortcomings before mishaps and have been widely used in other high-risk industries.
Methods: The Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Safety (LOTICS) scale was developed and
evaluated with respect to factor structure and reliability of the scales. The survey was administered to the staff
of operating rooms at two university hospitals, and intensive care units (ICUs) of one university hospital and
one teaching hospital. The response rate varied between 40–47%. Data of 330 questionnaires were
analysed. Safety aspects between the different groups were compared.
Results: Factor analyses and tests for reliability resulted in nine subscales. To these scales another two were
added making a total of 11. The reliability of the scales varied from 0.75 to 0.88. The results clearly showed
differences between units (OR1, OR2, ICU1, ICU2) and staff.
Conclusion: The results seem to justify the conclusion that the LOTICS scale can be used in both the operating
room and ICU to gain insight into the system failures, in a relatively quick and reliable manner. Furthermore
the LOTICS scale can be used to compare organisations to each other, monitor changes in patient safety, as
well as monitor the effectiveness of the changes made to improve the level of patient safety.
S
ince the publication of the Institute of Medicine report To
err is human in 2000, improving patient safety has become
a core issue for many modern healthcare institutes.1
According to this report and other studies conducted around
the globe, approximately 10% of all patients admitted to
hospital suffer some kind of harm, about half of which is
preventable with current standards of treatment.2–6 The ques-
tion arises of how systematic action can be taken to avert these
preventable errors. For a long time a person-aimed analysis and
prevention approach has been the dominant approach to
improve patient safety in health care. In this approach the
focus is directed at the ever-present ‘‘human factor’’, being the
individual responsible for making the error. Medical errors are
considered the result of forgetfulness, inattention, lack of
motivation and neglect.7–9 Despite the fact that accidents are to
a significant extent caused by human failure, approaches
directed to human shortcomings seldom solve the problem.10 11
There is widespread evidence from research in several domains
that indicates that individual errors are often the result of
structural system failures.12 This implies that incident investi-
gations should not be limited to the description of unsafe acts
and/or situations that preceded the accidents, the active
failures. Instead, investigations should particularly be directed
to the identification of the system factors that contributed to
the adverse event—the latent failures—which are frequently
the result of management decisions.13 14 Several studies have
shown that latent failures can be grouped into a limited
number of classes. Analysis of major disasters, shipping
accidents, accidents in the exploration and oil production,
railway operations and aircraft engineering showed 11 classes
of so-called General Failure Types.8 14 In a study conducted by
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO; http://www.jcaho.com) into the root
cause analyses of 2500 incidents, 10 classes of underlying
causes were discerned (fig 1).
In recent years health care has increasingly accepted a systems
approach for the analysis of incidents and identification of the
latent and environmental conditions that lead to adverse
events.7 15–17 The translation of this approach in the medical
world evolved largely to reactive methods and, in only a handful
of cases, tomore proactivemethods.18 19 In safety-critical domains
other than health care, techniques have been developed that
objectively detect structural shortcomings before they can lead to
incidents and that can be used to assess and monitor the safety
situation within an organisation.20 In this study we aim to
develop a comprehensive survey instrument that measures
system factors contributing to adverse events (latent risk factors)
in the operating theatre and intensive care unit and which
identifies specific areas of concern by comparing staff reactions
on system factors across units and medical disciplines. The
development of the instrument is part of the Leiden Operating
Theatre Safety (LOTS) study. The LOTS study aims to improve the
quality of patient safety by identifying system failures and
facilitating the development and evaluation of corrective actions
to reduce the risk of future errors. The present article reports
details of the development and the psychometric properties of the
Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Safety (LOTICS)
scale. In addition to the psychometric aspects of the LOTICS scale
its validity was studied in more detail by including work-related
safety goals as a criterion measure. It was expected that
subgroups with significantly lower than average scores on latent
risk factors (LRFs) would report more safety goals in the areas
related to the LRFs on which they were less favourable than on
LRFs for which their scores were equal to or above the average
score. Further it was expected that subgroups with lower than
average scores on LRFs would mention more safety goals than
subgroups with equal to or higher than average scores on LRFs.
We also investigated the relation between LRFs, safety culture
and perceived error rate. After all, in a reporting and learning
culture, system weaknesses should ‘‘decrease’’ over time as
Abbreviations: ICU, intensive care unit; LOTS study, Leiden Operating









corrective actions are implemented.8 In a similar vein, a more
positive safety culture and fewer system weaknesses should
eventually result in a reduction in error rates. Unfortunately,
errors in health care are strongly underreported.1 22 Moreover, the
tendency to underreport errors has been found to be inversely
related to safety culture.23 Given these findings we expected
significant correlations between LRFs and safety culture, but no




Staff from two university hospitals and one teaching hospital in
the Netherlands participated in the study. In one of the
university hospitals both the operating room centre and the
intensive care unit (ICU) participated. In the other university
hospital only the operating room participated, and in the
teaching hospital only the ICU. All nurses and medical
specialists, both staff and trainees, who had been in their job
three months or more were approached and invited to
participate in the study. Of the 782 who met this criterion
(485 from the operating theatre and 297 from the ICU) 344
completed the inventory. Of the 344 returned survey forms 330
(42%) were suitable for further analysis (40% in operating
theatres, 47% in ICUs). The demographic data, working hours
and working experience are given in table 1.
Survey instrument
The questionnaire comprises four parts (99 items) and has an
additional demographic section where respondents fill in their
department or ward, job position, contracted hours per week,
job tenure, age group and gender.
I . Latent risk factors
A multidisciplinary team consisting of four employees from the
operating theatre, ICU and management, two anaesthesiolo-
gists and two surgeons was asked to make an inventory of
possible process failures in the operating theatre and the ICU.
The inventory was reviewed by the 10-member multidisciplin-
ary supervising board of the LOTS study, to ascertain the
completeness of the inventory. A total of 50 potential process
failures were identified. Next, the members of the supervising
board were interviewed to identify possible underlying causes
and effects of these failures. Finally, the investigators cate-
gorised the underlying causes, defining 10 item categories:
Staffing Resources, Communication, Planning and
Coordination, Training, Procedures, Design, Material
Resources, Maintenance, Teamwork and Situation Awareness.
Two of these item categories were measured with scales of the
Leiden Quality of Work Scale (LQWS) for Hospitals:24 Staffing
Resources (6 items) and Material Resources (5 items). Table 2
shows the items with the LQWS factor loadings and Cronbach
alpha. Responses were given on a four-point Likert-type scale as
follows: 1 (totally disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (agree) to 4 (totally
agree), with higher scores indicating more resources. To
measure the other eight item categories a pool of 90 items
was developed, and reviewed by the supervising board on
phrasing (readability and applicability) and validity (complete-
ness and relevance). Some items were deleted leaving a total
pool of 74 items. Respondents indicated their agreement with
each item on the four-point scale.
I I. Safety culture
In this study safety culture was defined as the willingness to
report, analyse and learn from errors and adverse events, which
Reason called a ‘‘reporting and learning safety culture’’.8 Safety
culture was measured with nine items based on a checklist to
evaluate interventions to strengthen a culture of safety25 (for
example, ‘‘After an incident not much is done’’; a=0.77).
Responses were given on a four-point Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (totally disagree) to 4 (totally agree).
I I I . Perceived rate of errors
The third section asked respondents to report how often errors,
near-misses and incidents occurred in their departments. The
three items were scored on a six-point scale ranging from 1
(never) to 6 (very frequently).
IV. Safety goals
The fourth section asked respondents to report in free text the
three most important work goals they wanted to attain in the
coming year to improve patient safety in the operating room/
ICU.
Data analysis
The data were analysed using the statistical software package
SPSS version 10. Exploratory factor analyses were conducted to
assess the underlying factor structure of the 74-item ques-
tionnaire. The scale reliability was assessed by Cronbach’s
alpha. Bivariate correlations were calculated to examine the
pattern of direct relationships between the LRFs, safety culture
and perceived rate of errors. To examine the discriminative
value of the LOTICS scale, differences in LRFs across different
operational units and different medical disciplines were
evaluated using one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for
each of the LRFs, followed by planned linear comparisons. To
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Figure 1 Most importance root causes of 2500 incidents reported to the
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to operational unit: operating theatre (OR1 and OR2) and
intensive care unit (ICU1 and ICU2), and by medical discipline:
theatre nurses, anaesthesia nurses, operatin room trainees,
operating room recovery nurses, physicians, and intensive care
nurses. To examine the relation between staff’s reported
number and type of safety goals and perceptions on the latent
risk factors, the subgroups by medical discipline were further
divided to operational unit. Finally, subgroup means and
overall means on each of the 11 LRFs were calculated.
Subgroup means were then compared to the overall mean
using Student’s t test to define those subgroups answering
favourable/unfavourable on LRFs.
RESULTS
Psychometric characteristics of the LOTICS scale
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the 74 latent
risk items using principal components extraction with varimax
rotation and the scree-test criterion.26 The analysis revealed a
solution with nine factors explaining 48% of the total variance.
Using as criterion a cut off point of 0.40 for item loadings in the
rotated factor loading matrix and interpretability of the scales,
47 items loaded unambiguously and meaningfully on one of the
nine factors and with reasonable congruence with a priori
content areas. The nine factors were labeled: Task-related
Communication, Teamwork, Team Instruction, Training,
Procedures, Situation Awareness, Planning and Coordination,
Maintenance and Design. To increase the internal reliability of
four scales seven items were excluded, leaving 40 items to
measure the nine components. The final subscale internal
consistencies are moderate to high (Cronbach a varied between
0.75–0.88). Table 2 shows the items with their factor loadings
and the Cronbach value for each of the LOTICS subscales.
Correlations
Table 3 provides the correlations among all variables. Correlations
between the LOTICS subscales and safety culture were all
significant and positive with highest correlations found between
safety culture and Training (0.40) and safety culture and
Planning and Coordination (0.43). Correlations between the
LOTICS subscales and perceived error rate were generally not
significant. Safety culture and perceived error rate correlated
statistically significantly, but correlations were weak (0.21).
Table 2 Factor structure, factor loadings and internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of the LOTICS scale
Communication Information about changes in OR programme/planned procedure timely provided 0.750
a= 0.84 Information about changes in OR programme/planned procedure are communicated through the right channels 0.685
Adequate communication about patients with other disciplines 0.631
Information to perform procedure available at the time when it is needed 0.620
Adequate communication about patients between teams 0.617
Information to perform procedure not properly communicated 0.613
Maintenance Maintenance carried out on a regular basis 0.855
a= 0.87 Maintenance inspection performed timely 0.808
OR/ICU equipment badly maintained 0.731
Maintenance schedule is lagging 0.703
Training Adequate coaching of new personnel 0.706
a= 0.81 Keeping employees informed about new medical/technological developments 0.634
Training employees in the operation of new equipment 0.617
Adequate supervision of trainees in their practical period 0.613
Co-workers on my department have the necessary qualifications 0.531
In OR a combination of staff junior/junior are avoided/on the ICU an adequate mix of seniority is applied 0.513
Situation Awareness Team members alert each other to problems 0.772
a= 0.79 Members of my team know what one another is doing 0.705
Members of my team monitor each other’s performance 0.681
Adequate exchange of information during the operation/shift 0.571
Procedures Accessibility of procedures/regulations/rules 0.659
a= 0.81 Violations of procedures/regulations/rules 0.651
Procedures/regulations/rules frequently not clear 0.543
Procedures/regulations/rules frequently not applicable in practice 0.525
Procedures/regulations/rules applied correctly 0.513
Procedures taken a bit less seriously to do a better job 0.500
Design Equipment operation is difficult 0.751
a= 0.76 Controls or displays are hard to read 0.730
Controls of displays are unclear and/or lacking 0.624
Too much information on controls or display 0.563
Teamwork I really feel I am a part of my team 0.668
a= 0.75 Team’s ability to deal with unexpected events 0.614
Members of my team work together as a well coordinated team 0.496
Clear view of who is doing what and when 0.453
Planning and Coordination Organisational changes not adequately supported within the department 0.593
a= 0.75 Lack of advance planning within the department 0.530
Sufficiency of planning 0.501
Team Instructions Team members debriefed on what they can expect during operation/shift 0.657
a= 0.76 Team members sufficiently instructed during operation/shift 0.653
I have confidence in my other team members 0.541
Material Resources Worn-out or faulty equipment replaced in a timely way 0.582
a= 0.75 Following new technologies when procuring new equipment 0.554
Equipment frequently repaired 0.552
Insufficient quality of materials and equipment 0.527
Availability of materials and equipment at the time it is needed 0.412
Staff Resources Enough experienced staff available 0.623
a= 0.75 Enough support staff to provide good care 0.592
Enough staff to provide good care 0.569
Enough physicians to provide good care 0.557
Enough experienced staff available 0.536
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According to one-way ANOVA, eight of the 11 LOTICS
dimensions discriminated significantly between different
operational units (table 4). For two scales the differences
between the operational units approached significance
(Situation Awareness, p=0.062, Procedures, p=0.054).
Compared with OR1, OR2 and ICU2, ICU1 reported significant
more problems for Material Resources (mean difference ICU1 v
OR1 0.20, 95% CI 0.04 to 0.35, mean difference ICU1 v OR2
0.17, 95% CI 0.01 to 0.34, mean difference ICU1 v ICU2 0.59,
95% CI 0.41 to 0.77), and for Maintenance (mean difference
ICU1 v OR1 0.07, 95% CI 0.00 to 0.13, mean difference ICU1 v
OR2 0.11, 95% CI 0.04 to 0.17, mean difference ICU1 v ICU2
0.18, 95% CI 0.11 to 0.26). ICU1 also reported more problems
for Design than did OR1 and ICU2 (mean difference ICU1 v
OR1 0.15, 95% CI 0.01 to 0.30, mean difference ICU1 v ICU2
0.34, 95% CI 0.17 to 0.50). Compared with the ICUs, the
operating theatres encountered more problems with Teamwork
(mean difference OR1 v ICU1 0.15, 95% CI 0.03 to 0.28, mean
difference OR1 v ICU2 0.18, 95% IC 0.01 to 0.33, mean
difference OR2 v ICU1 0.14, 95% CI 0.01 to 0.28, mean
difference OR2 v ICU2 0.18, 95% CI 0.03 to 0.33). Operating
theatre staff also had more problems with Training (TR) and
Communication (CO) than ICU staff, with OR1 reporting more
problems than ICU1 and ICU2 (TR: mean difference OR1 v
ICU1 0.24, 95% CI 0.09 to 0.40, mean difference OR1 v ICU2
0.38, 95% CI 0.20 to 0.55, and CO: mean difference OR1 v ICU1
0.34, 95% CI 0.19 to 0.49, mean difference OR1 v ICU2 0.54,
95% CI 0.38 to 0.71), and with OR2 reporting more problems
than ICU2 (TR: mean difference OR2 v ICU1 0.10, 95% CI 0.07
to 0.27, mean difference OR2 v ICU2 0.23, 95% CI 0.05 to 0.42,
and CO: mean difference OR2 v ICU1 0.16, 95% CI 0.00 to 0.33,
mean difference OR2 v ICU2 0.37, 95% CI 0.19 to 0.55).
Medical discipline
One-way ANOVA showed that all LOTICS dimensions, except
for Procedures, discriminated significantly between staff in
different job positions (table 5).
Anaesthesia nurses reported more problems for LRFs than
the other medical disciplines, while physicians and intensive
care nurses reported fewer problems for LRFs. Inspection of the
Table 3 Intercorrelations between the LOTICS subscales, safety culture and perceived rate of errors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Staffing Resources
2. Maintenance 0.370**
3. Training 0.550** 0.342**
4. Situation Awareness 0.183** 0.265** 0.421**
5. Procedures 0.267** 0.365** 0.428** 0.420**
6. Communication 0.444** 0.334** 0.462** 0.317** 0.388**
7. Design 0.260** 0.420** 0.196** 0.208** 0.398** 0.331**
8. Planning and Coordination 0.456** 0.427** 0.590** 0.367** 0.517** 0.482** 0.352**
9. Teamwork 0.403** 0.347** 0.579** 0.472** 0.475** 0.415** 0.235** 0.522**
10. Team Instructions 0.315** 0.261** 0.522** 0.520** 0.331** 0.399** 0.141* 0.366** 0.541**
11. Material Resources 0.547** 0.546** 0.372** 0.209** 0.407** 0.482** 0.475** 0.514** 0.326** 0.253**
12. Safety Culture 0.239** 0.305** 0.401** 0.347** 0.338** 0.343** 0.175** 0.425** 0.333** 0.336** 0.330**
13. Perceived error rate 0.089 0.049 0.098 0.181** 0.277** 0.147** 0.097 0.109 0.148** 0.084 0.176** 0.212**
*p,0.05; **p,0.01 (two-tailed).
Table 4 ANOVA mean LOTICS subscale scores for each of the operational units, with standard deviations and degrees of freedom
in parenthesis: OR1, OR2, ICU1 and ICU2
LOTICS subscales
Units
OR1 (n = 112) OR2 (n = 81) ICU1 (n = 79) ICU2 (n = 57) F ratio p Value Effect size*
Staffing Resources 2.71 (0.46)a 2.81 (0.30)b 2.80 (0.35)c 3.24 (0.40)abc 24.77 (3, 324) ,0.001
0.187
Training 2.68 (0.45)ab 2.82 (0.38)c 2.92 (0.35)a 3.05 (0.37)bc 13.09 (3, 324) ,0.001
0.108
Procedures 2.70 (0.33) 2.74 (0.33) 2.64 (0.37) 2.80 (0.40) 2.57 (3, 320) 0.054
0.023
Planning and Coordination 2.72 (0.37)a 2.83 (0.37)b 2.84 (0.32)c 3.02 (0.38)abc 8.77 (3, 322) ,0.001
0.075
Communication 2.43 (0.43)abc 2.61 (0.39)bd 2.78 (0.39)ae 2.98 (0.33)cde 27.94 (3, 324) ,0.001
0.205
Teamwork 2.91 (0.33)ab 2.93 (0.28)cd 3.07 (0.31)ac 3.10 (0.34)bd 6.70 (3, 323) ,0.001
0.058
Team Instructions 2.84 (0.39) 2.84 (0.33) 2.89 (0.40) 2.98 (0.42) 1.96 (3, 315) 0.120
0.018
Situation Awareness 2.85 (0.41) 2.79 (0.44) 2.89 (0.36) 2.71 (0.47) 2.47 (3, 319) 0.062
0.023
Material Resources 2.60 (0.35)ab 2.57 (0.39)cd 2.60 (0.44)ace 2.98 (0.43)bde 25.46 (3, 317) ,0.001
0.194
Maintenance 2.78 (0.45)ab 2.92 (0.38)cd 2.58 (0.35) 3.10 (0.37)bde 15.94 (3, 306) ,0.001
0.135
Design 2.95 (0.32)ab 2.94 (0.38)c 2.79 (0.38)ad 3.13 (0.41)bcd 9.95 (3, 319) ,0.001
0.085
Means that differ significantly (p,0.05) by the Bonferroni procedure share an identical superscript within a row.
*Partial Eta squared.
48 Beuzekom, Akerboom, Boer
www.qshc.com
group.bmj.com on November 30, 2009 - Published by qshc.bmj.comDownloaded from 
 
 34 
data for unit differences showed, however, that it was foremost
anaesthesia nurses in OR1 and intensive care nurses in ICU2
who accounted for the significant findings.
Criterion validity
The participants mentioned a total of 545 work goals to improve
patient safety on their respective departments. Two people (one
research staff member and one member of the supervisory
board of the LOTS study) categorised the goals according to one
of the 11 LOTICS subscales it referred to. The categorisation
found 412 goals related to the LOTICS subscales. Safety goals
that did not concern LRFs were categorised as ‘‘safety culture’’
(41), ‘‘hygiene’’ (10), ‘‘work space’’ (27), ‘‘work climate’’ (19)
and ‘‘miscellaneous’’ (36).
On average 10.1 safety goals were reported for LRFs, with
unfavourable scores against 3.2 goals for LRFs with favourable
scores. A relatively large part of the reported safety goals (30%)
were concerned with the factors communication and training,
even if the factors’ scores did not lag behind the average.
On average the subgroups which were less favourable on
LRFs—anaesthesia nurses in OR1 and nurses in ICU1—
mentioned more safety goals than the other subgroups (2.32
v 1.58 (p,0.01) and 1.98 v 1.51 (p,0.01), respectively). Most
safety goals were mentioned in the areas related to the LRFs on
which they were less favourable. On average the nurses in ICU2
reported more favourably on LRFs and on average mentioned
fewer safety goals than the other subgroups (0.98 v 1.72
(p,0.001)). These nurses, however, had a lower score on
Situation Awareness and mentioned more often safety goals
that relate to this aspect than on average (13% v 3%). Although
nurses in ICU2 reported more favourably on Safety Culture
than most other medical disciplines they reported less
favourably on perceived rate of errors.
DISCUSSION
If system-directed methods are used in health care to monitor
and improve patient safety generally reactive methods are
used.27 Several factors influence the adequacy of these methods
to identify the sensibility of the system to errors and the
underlying causes of incidents. The most important factor is the
level of reporting of incidents and errors. In healthcare
underreporting of incidents and errors is a common phenom-
enon. A second factor is that most incident analyses describe
only ‘‘who’’ was involved and ‘‘what’’ occurred with limited
attention paid to the underlying latent failures. Even if errors
and incidents are reduced to system factors, the identified
failures that have led to that specific incident are not
necessarily indications of weaknesses in the organisation as a
whole, restricting lessons to be learned about the prevention of
future similar occurrences.14 28 Consequently, a large number of
incidents has to be analysed, as in the JCAHO study, to get a
reliable impression of the organisation’s system weaknesses.
Finally, the lack of standardised reporting and analysis
precludes sharing data for benchmarking.
Given the limitations of the reactive approach the current
study aims to identify system failures in the operating room
and ICU, irrespective of the errors and incidents that occur by
using the purposely-developed instrument, the LOTICS scale.
The LOTICS scale seems to be a reliable and valid diagnostic
tool with the ability to identify system failures and to
differentiate between units and medical disciplines. The items
are representative of the construct to be measured and they
address various parts of the construct. The groups which report
less favourably on LRFs mention more safety goals than groups
with favourable scores and the reported goals particularly
involve LRFs with unfavourable scores. Apparently absolute
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scales with only average scores (Communication and Training)
the respondents suggested safety goals. Similarly, JCAHO
observed that in the incident analyses of 2500 incidents over
the last 10 years Communication and Training were mentioned
as (additional) causes in the incidents (fig 1). Problems with
communication played a role in 65% of the incidents, while
training deficiencies were mentioned in 56% of cases.18 29–33 The
significance of the other LRFs in our study—Staffing
Resources,34 Procedures,31 35 Situation Awareness,36 37
Teamwork,15 19 31 34 38 Team Instructions,19 Design and
Maintenance of equipment,18 19 39 40 Planning and
Coordination13 39—was also observed in other studies.
Correlations between the LOTICS subscales and safety
culture were generally moderate and in the expected direction,
indicating that individuals reporting fewer problems with LRFs
scored higher on safety culture. Correlations with the perceived
rate of errors were generally not significant. The correlation
between safety culture and perceived rate of errors was
significant but also very weak. These findings are in line with
the results of another study indicating that if systemic factors
and safety culture are rated favourably the probability of
incidents is low but the willingness to report incidents (and the
ability to recognise near-misses and incidents) is high.23
Reversely, in organisations in which the scores on safety
culture and systemic factors are more negative, more incidents
occur, but the willingness to report these incidents is lower. The
fact that organisations with more positive scores on safety
culture are more prepared to report errors and (near) incidents
may explain why the group ‘‘nurses in ICU2’’ with the most
favourable LRFs has a higher perceived rate of errors than the
other groups.
There are limitations to our study. The response rate varied
between 40–47% and thus we may have introduced a response
bias. However, there were no differences between responders
and the total population on sex, age and function. This
suggested that the overall results would probably not be
affected by non-response bias. The results of the data set
support the construct validity of the LOTICS, which needs to be
confirmed in replications of this research and comparison with
other measures. Further work is also necessary to examine the
test-retest reliability of the LOTICS and its predictive validity.
In conclusion, we believe that the LOTICS scale can be used
in both the operating room and ICU to gain insight into the
system failures, in a relatively quick and reliable manner.
Furthermore the LOTICS scale can be used to compare
organisations with each other, monitor changes in patient
safety, as well as monitor the effectiveness of the changes made
to improve the level of patient safety.
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Abstract
Background: Patient safety is one of the greatest challenges in healthcare. In the operating room errors are
frequent and often consequential. This article describes an approach to a successful implementation of a patient
safety program in the operating room, focussing on latent risk factors that influence patient safety. We performed
an intervention to improve these latent risk factors (LRFs) and increase awareness of patient safety issues amongst
OR staff.
Methods: Latent risk factors were studied using a validated questionnaire applied to the OR staff before and after
an intervention. A pre-test/post-test control group design with repeated measures was used to evaluate the effects
of the interventions. The staff from one operating room of an university hospital acted as the intervention group.
Controls consisted of the staff of the operating room in another university hospital. The outcomes were the
changes in LRF scores, perceived incident rate, and changes in incident reports between pre- and post-intervention.
Results: Based on pre-test scores and participants’ key concerns about organizational factors affecting patient safety
in their department the intervention focused on the following LRFs: Material Resources, Training and Staffing
Recourses. After the intervention, the intervention operating room - compared to the control operating room -
reported significantly fewer problems on Material Resources and Staffing Resources and a significantly lower score
on perceived incident rate. The contribution of technical factors to incident causation decreased significantly in the
intervention group after the intervention.
Conclusion: The change of state of latent risk factors can be measured using a patient safety questionnaire aimed
at these factors. The change of the relevant risk factors (Material and Staffing resources) concurred with a decrease
in perceived and reported incident rates in the relevant categories. We conclude that interventions aimed at
unfavourable latent risk factors detected by a questionnaire focussed at these factors may contribute to the
improvement of patient safety in the OR.
Background
Patient safety is one of the greatest imperatives in
healthcare today [1]. However, there are many obstacles
that must be overcome to make the healthcare system
truly safe. This article describes one approach to suc-
cessful implementation of a patient safety program at
the systemic level. A specific strategy for operationaliz-
ing a safety program is provided. Through this strategy
it is possible to identify and address safety concerns pro-
actively, to develop specific tools and resources that can
be used to support an environment of safety and create
mechanisms to modify the program in response to pa-
tient and staff needs as well as changing priorities. In the
contrast between events that are often minor, but salient,
and the major, but latent or hidden, systemic weak-
nesses, most attention has been devoted to the obvious
problems. Success here, with individual protocols and
techniques, tackles the patient safety problem one issue
at a time. This article attempts to attack the deeper-
seated underlying problems that, when accurately identi-
fied, allow for remedial actions that can impact whole
classes of issues simultaneously.
It is increasingly accepted that adverse outcomes are
often due to system failures, whereby deficiencies at
many different levels create the context in which human
error can have a negative impact [2-4]. Studies also have
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shown that organizational factors contributing to error
and to safety can be grouped into a limited number of
general failure classes or Latent Risk Factors (LRFs), in-
cluding such error-producing conditions such as poor
design, maintenance failures, unworkable procedures,
shortfalls in training, less than adequate tools and equip-
ment and inadequate staffing [5]. For example, nurse
understaffing has been ranked by both the public and
physicians as one of the greatest threats to patient safety
in US hospitals [6]. The identification of LRFs, that may
impact the expected course of care and often comprom-
ise patient safety, can support a better understanding of
the operating room as a system and the identification of
system components that influence patient safety [7]. A
proactive systems approach to surgical safety suggests
that it is necessary to study all aspects of the system that
comprises a surgical operation, ranging from such issues
as equipment design and use, to communication and
team coordination [8,9]. Safety experts argue that pro-
actively reducing such latent risk factors, that increase
the risk of error by many individuals, will result in deli-
vering safer care more quickly than taking measures
directed, often reactively, at specific individuals [2]. Con-
sistent with the objective of minimal patient harm, safety
management in health care should be proactive rather
than reactive; that is, broad risks should be anticipated
and reduced before patients are harmed rather than
waiting to identify specific problems and then attacking
them. The question is, how can you identify such risks
before an incident, rather than waiting for an adverse
event or hoping for a report that can uncover a
problem?
A proactive error management system, designed to
measure and reduce the adverse impact of LRFs within
an organization, may provide the answer. Proactive sys-
tems work in part by asking people to judge how fre-
quently each of a number of factors such as staffing,
supervision, procedures and communication impacts
adversely on specific aspects of their work. This type of
proactive approach allows the identification of LRFs be-
fore they give rise to errors that can compromise pa-
tient safety. Such a system may serve not only to
reduce error, but also to foster a culture that, by mov-
ing away from blaming the individual, encourages
reporting, creating a virtuous circle [10]. In the operat-
ing room (OR) errors are frequent and often conse-
quential. In reported studies on the incidence of
adverse events in hospitals, the largest number occurs
in the OR. The proportion of adverse events in the op-
erating room appears to be remarkably stable, compris-
ing approximately 50 % of all adverse events within a
hospital [1,11-13]. This suggests that the OR is a do-
main in which improved safety is an urgent and signifi-
cant challenge. A critical first step in an improvement
process involves systematically addressing those factors
contributing to adverse events in the OR. Increased
awareness of patient safety issues and the resources that
are available to both health care practitioners and con-
sumers can help staff ward off patient safety problems
before they occur [14].
Aim of the study
This study is prospective and is concerned with the
question whether an intervention, based on a safety pro-
gram, leads to improvement on latent risk factors and
an increase in incident reporting. It was anticipated that
concretely addressing LRFs, rather than just a general
awareness campaign, will contribute to the prevention
of future errors and consequently to improved patient
outcomes. This article describes the results of the inter-




A pre-test/post-test control group design was used to
evaluate the effects of the interventions. The staff from
one university hospital operating room acted as the
intervention group (I-OR). The control group which
received no interventions consisted of the staff of the
OR in another university hospital (C-OR). The organiza-
tions were located in the Netherlands. At baseline and
again at follow-up after 1.5 year all staff (including trai-
nees) and operating room nurses/technicians who had
been in their job three months or more were approached
and invited to fill out the survey. The study was
approved by the Research Ethics Board of the Leiden
University Medical Centre (the Netherlands).
LOTS-study
The hypothesis that correcting LRFs, concentrating on
systemic rather than individual issues, will result in safer
care became the cornerstone of the Leiden Operating
Theatre Safety (LOTS) project. This project aims to
identify system failures in the OR irrespective of the
errors and incidents directly, and to develop and evalu-
ate interventions to reduce those failures, leading to a
reduction in errors in the long term.
To assess the OR’s resistance to error a comprehensive
survey instrument was developed measuring the pres-
ence of systemic failures that lie dormant in the working
environment of the operating room and intensive care
unit - the Leiden Operating Theatre and Intensive Care
Safety (LOTICS) scale. It can be used in a pre-test, inter-
vention, post-test design to evaluate the effectiveness of
changes brought about in the hospital or a specific unit
[15].






The approach taken to assess the state of the individual
LRFs is analogous to a health check, assessing a limited
number of well-chosen diagnostic vital signs. Items, pre-
sented as statements, can be indicators of either poten-
tial problems or good practice. Possessing the former or
lacking the latter can both be treated as indications that
there are latent failures present in a particular LRF. Fail-
ure to find indications of problems and possession of the
factors that are evidence of good practice can both be
treated as indications that there are no latent failures
present in a particular LRF.
Latent risk factors were measured with the LOTICS-
scale (Additional file 1: appendix 1) [15]. The LOTICS has
been validated with respect to factor structure and reliabil-
ity of the scales, as well as its content and discriminative
validity, and measures 11 LRFs with a total of 51 indicator
questions: Training (6 items, α= .77; e.g. “In my depart-
ment, staff are well trained in the use of new equipment”),
Staffing Resources (6 items, α= .81; e.g. “In my depart-
ment, there are enough experienced staff”), Planning &
Coordination (3 items α= .75; e.g. “In my department, only
short-term plans are made”), Communication (6 items,
α= .84; e.g. “Information to perform procedure is available
at the time when it is needed“), Material Resources (5
items, α= .75; e.g. “In my department, material/equipment
is of insufficient quality”), Maintenance (4 items, α= .81;
e.g. “Maintenance inspections are carried out on time”),
Design (4 items, α= .78; e.g. “Controls or displays are hard
to read”), Quality of Procedures (6 items, α= .79; e.g. “In
my department, procedures, rules, and guidelines are often
not feasible in practice”), Teamwork (4 items, α= .74; e.g.
“Members of my team work well together during the oper-
ation ”), Team Instruction (3 items, α= .80; e.g. “Team
members receive sufficient instructions during the oper-
ation”), and Situational Awareness (4 items, α= .77; e.g.
“There is sufficient information exchange during the sur-
gery”). Respondents indicate their agreement on a 4-point
rating scale (1= strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree). The
same scalar structure was presented throughout the ques-
tionnaire, and then adjusted post-hoc. For all LFRs, nega-
tively formulated items were recoded so that a higher
score always indicates more favorable perceptions about
organizational and environmental conditions of work.
Perceived incident rate
In this study, incidents are defined as all safety-related
events including accidents (with negative outcomes such
as damage and injury), near misses (where an accident
could have happened had there been no timely and ef-
fective recovery) and errors (no harm events). We asked
respondents to report how often errors, near-misses and
accidents occurred in their departments. The three items
were scored on a six-point scale ranging from 1 (never)
to 6 (very frequently), with a higher score indicating a
greater perception of incidents.
The questionnaire has an additional demographic sec-
tion where respondents fill in their department or ward,
job tenure on current ward (1 =<1 year, 2 = 1-5 years,
3 = 6–10 years, and 4=> 10 years), age and gender.
Finally, participants were asked about the organizational
and environmental conditions that affect patient safety in
their department and the possible remediable action alter-
natives for addressing them.
Incident reporting
Incident data were collected and then systematically
analysed using the Prevention and Recovery Information
System for Monitoring and Analysis (PRISMA) - Med-
ical method over a 12-month period before and after the
intervention [16]. The PRISMA method is based on the
so-called system approach to the problem of human
error and therefore concentrates on the conditions
under which individuals work. It was originally devel-
oped in and for the steel industry and has been applied
successfully in the medical domain [16,17]. Key compo-
nents are an in-depth incident analysis to detect causal
factors, and the Eindhoven Classification Model to clas-
sify the root causes found into technical, organizational,
human, and patient related factors.
Intervention
A multidisciplinary safety committee (surgeons, anesthe-
tists, operating room and recovery nurses) was created to
improve incident reporting and to develop a number of
measures aimed at the LRFs which need improvement.
The level of reporting of incidents was considered to
be an important factor of the safety program. To im-
prove the quality and completeness of reporting inci-
dents and to achieve a general raising of awareness of
patient safety problems we developed and implemented
a voluntary electronic/web based reporting system and
provided feedback to demonstrate the value of reporting
by showing its effects on organizational culture and pa-
tient safety. Feedback was always provided at team level.
In case of serious incidents there was also feedback at
the individual level. All reports were reviewed by safety
committee members, and selected reports were dis-
cussed during the monthly meetings. When required,
reports were further analyzed by individual committee
members according to their expertise.
The results of the pre-test formed the basis for the
choice of interventions. Based on these results (see
Table 1) the following LRFs were considered best targets
for intervention: Communication, Material Resources,
Training, Planning, and Staffing Resources. Compared to
the other LRFs respondents in I-OR scored less favorably






on these LRFs. On three of these LRFs, i.e. Communica-
tion, Planning and Training, the I-OR scored even lower
than the C-OR (see Table 1).
At baseline we asked participants about their concerns
on patient safety in their department. A number of issues
related to the LRFs studied were named. On average, three
times more issues were identified for LRFs with unfavour-
able scores than for LRFs with favourable scores. In I-OR
most problems concerned Training, Material Resources,
and Staffing Resources. Given these findings and to create
as much possible involvement for the intervention we
decided to focus on these three LRFs. However we rea-
lized that an intervention can have effects on other LRFs
beyond the three selected, because changes do not occur
in isolation. Moreover, in the literature, Material
Resources, Training and Staffing Resources are mentioned
as important contributors to medical errors [18,19].
Material resources (1) Surgical adverse events are often
attributable to technique-related procedures that occur
during the operation, many of which are considered pre-
ventable [20] [21]. Variations in equipment in its use in-
crease the likelihood of error [22]. People may be more
willing to violate safety rules because the material does
not function in the way it is supposed to do, either be-
cause of poor maintenance or because of faulty design.
Training (2) Lack of training and experience are also
mentioned as sources of medical errors, although these
causes are usually not directly documented in studies of
errors and incidents. Training has, however, been shown
to decrease incident rates and increase the ability to
solve problems, particularly for inexperienced profes-
sionals [23-25].
Staffing resources (3). There is little published work
examining the relationship between workload and either
quality or safety of anaesthetic care [26]. Staff often
forms the last layer of defence for error occurrence and
understaffing or insufficient staffing is a threat to patient
safety in the OR [27]. Adequate staffing is fundamental
to quality care; evidence is mounting that increasing the
number of registered nurses results in better patient
safety [28]. Higher staffing levels are associated with
lower mortality outcomes in UK hospitals [29].
We started the intervention with a training session to
show which errors are made in the operating room and
how they can be traced back to latent risk factors. In
addition, sessions were held to introduce the new
Table 1 Mean LOTICS scores and perceived incident rate at pre-test compared for the I-OR and the C-OR (t-tests)
LRFs of LOTIC-scale I- OR N=111 C-OR N =82 Mean SD t df P 95 % CI
Communication I-OR 2.43 .43 -3.00 186 .003 -.055 .12
C-OR 2.61 .39
Design I-OR 2.95 .32 .07 182 .942 -.017 .14
C-OR 2.94 .38
Maintenance I-OR 2.78 .53 -1.88 174 .061 -.16 .06
C-OR 2.92 .40
Material Resources I-OR 2.59 .35 .33 185 .745 .09 .25
C-OR 2.57 .39
Planning & Coordination I-OR 2.71 .37 -2.25 183 .026 -.04 .13
C-OR 2.83 .37
Teamwork I-OR 2.91 .32 -.33 186 .740 .07 .19
C-OR 2.93 .29
Procedures I-OR 2.72 .33 -.82 184 .415 -.04 .09
C-OR 2.74 .33
Situation Awareness I-OR 2.85 .41 .96 182 .338 .12 .31
C-OR 2.79 .44
Team instructions I-OR 2.84 .40 -.10 178 .924 .12 .26
C-OR 2.84 .33
Training I-OR 2.67 .45 -2.36 187 .019 -.05 .12
C-OR 2.82 .38
Staffing Resources I-OR 2.71 .46 -187 100 .793 -.02 .16
C-OR 2.81 ,30
Perceived incident rate I-OR 3.97 .58 -.12 178 .901 -.02 .16
C-OR 3.98 .56
Significant values are shown in bold.




electronic reporting system. Subsequently, an exercise in-
volving standardization of materials and equipment was
performed. All OR staff then received training for all the
equipment used during operations. Parallel to this, a pro-
gram aimed at improving nurse retention was carried out
focussing on work climate characteristics like participation
in decision making, job autonomy and social support. The
content of the safety program is described in Table 2.
Statistical analyses
The data were analysed using the statistical software
package SPSS version 16. Negatively worded items were
reverse scored so that their valence matched the posi-
tively worded items. T-tests were used to assess differ-
ences at pre-test between the intervention (I-OR) and
control group (C-OR). Chi square analyse was used for
gender and reported incidents. As a means of assessing
the effects of the interventions, analyses of covariance
(ANCOVA) were carried out. In the ANCOVAs, age,
gender, job tenure on current ward, and pre-test scores
on LRFs and perceived incident rate were used as
covariates.
Participation and dropout
Baseline response rate was 59 %; 193 (I-OR 111 and C-
OR 82) out of 327 questionnaires were returned. The
response rate at post-test was 62 %; 205 (I-OR 108 and
C-OR 97) out of 333 questionnaires were returned. Of
the 111 professionals in I-OR and the 82 professionals
in C-OR who filled out the questionnaire at baseline, 62
in I-OR and 40 in C-OR participated at follow-up as
well. At both points of measurement there were no sig-
nificant differences in demographic characteristics be-
tween respondents and non-respondents. For both I-OR
and C-OR applies that there were no significant differ-
ences between subjects participating only in the first or
the second measurement and those who took part in
both measurements on demographic characteristics,
LRF scores and perceived incident rate. There was just
one exception; at the pre-test in C-OR staff who partici-
pated in both measurements reported more favorable
on Team Instructions than staff who participated only
in the first measurement.
Comparing I-OR with C-OR at pre-test on demo-
graphic characteristics, LRFs, and perceived error rate
Table 2 Safety program
Awareness To create awareness about safety, a symposium about safety was organized.
Topics were: the system approach to human error safety problems in the OR and incident reporting
Error reporting A local committee of the department’s anaesthesiology and surgery was set.
Introduction of an electronic incident reporting management system accessible to all staff and easy to use.
Providing feedback to demonstrate that reporting leads to changes.
Errors were discussed in the team meetings.
Every month a newsletter was distributed with information on reported errors.
and measures taken promoting report of near misses and errors.
Material Resources Inventory of all equipment and supplies of anaesthesia and surgery.
Standardization of equipment and supplies in anaesthesia and surgery for all equipment development of manuals
with a uniform design.
Training Training of all OR staff in the use of equipment.
Staffing Resources Increasing participation in decision making.
Introduction of frequently held staff meeting, at least once a month.
Increasing job autonomy shifting for a specific task responsibility and control from supervisor to staff.
Responsibility for safety in the working environment.
Intervision for registered nurses.
Personal coaches assigned to trainees.
Social activities to promote team building.
More trainees were trained.
Table 3 Demographic characteristics of the participants in the I-OR and C-OR at pre- and post-test
Pre-test I-OR N=110 C-OR N=82 t 95 %CI lower upper P
Age 35.4 (10.9) 40.8 (9.4) -3.26 (1,187) -7.95 -1.958 .001
Employment status (hours) 31.4 ( 9.3) 31.1 (11.7) .205 (1,185) -2.70 3.32 .868
Job tenure 2.7 (99) 3.2 (1.02) -.3.32 (1,185) -.87 -1.88 .001
Gender 11 % male 89 % female 36 % male 72 % female χ2 16.75 <.01
Post-test I-OR n= 108 C-OR n= 97 t 95 %CI lower upper P
Age 36.2 (11.4) 40.3 (11.3) -2.602- (1,202) -7.30 -1.006 .010
Employment status (hours) 30.8 (10) 31.2 (9.93) -.278(1, 202) -3.16 2.38 .781
Job tenure 2.8 (94) 2.8 (.93) .146 (1,203) -.278 .240 .884
Gender 10 % male 90 % female 23 % male 67 % female χ2 5.907 <.05






resulted in significant differences for years of employ-
ment and age (Table 3). Staff in the intervention group
was younger, had shorter job tenure and are more often
female. For this reason, age, job tenure on current
ward, and gender were entered as covariates in all effect
analyses for the group who took part in both measure-
ments. At the pre-test I-OR differed from C-OR on
three of the dependent variables: Communication, Plan-
ning & Coordination, and Training (Table 1). Staff in I-
OR reported less favourable on each of these LRFs than
staff in C-OR.
Effects of intervention
First, changes over time in the I-OR were analyzed by
comparing the results of all staff who took part at base-
line with those of all staff who took part at follow-up.
The results of the t-tests, pre- and post-test mean scores
on LRFs and perceived incident rate for I-OR and C-OR
are shown in Table 4.
The I-OR rated more favorably on Staffing Resources
and Material Resources at follow-up than at baseline.
For the other LRFs no statistically significant changes
over time were found, except for communication. This
LRF scored in the I-OR less favorably at follow-up than
at baseline. Finally, the I-OR scored significantly lower
on perceived incident rate at follow-up than at baseline.
At follow-up the C-OR rated more favorably on Design
and less favorably on Staffing Resources than at baseline.
Second, separate univariate ANCOVAs were con-
ducted, using data from staff that participated in both
measurements, to test if there had been a different devel-
opment in the I-OR compared to the C-OR from pre- to
post-test. The intervention had focused on three LRFs:
Material Resources, Training and Staffing Resources. So,
we expected at follow-up higher scores on these LRFs in
I-OR, indicating fewer problems, than in C-OR. Consist-
ent with our expectations, there was a positive effect of
the intervention aimed at Staffing Resources. When pre-
test scores, age, gender, and job tenure were used as cov-
ariates, a significant effect over time was found between
the I-OR and the C-OR. (Table 5). Staffing resources
improved in the I-OR but worsened in the C-OR from
pre-test to post-test measurement (Figure 1). There was
also a positive effect of the intervention aimed at Mater-
ial Resources. When pre-test scores, age, gender, and job
tenure, were used as covariates, a significant difference
was found on Material Resources to the advantage of the
I-OR (Figure 2). The intervention aimed at Training was
not significant. When pre-test scores, age, gender, and
job tenure, were used as covariates, there was no signifi-
cant difference between the I-OR and the C-OR on
Training over time.
We also expected in I-OR a decrease in perceived inci-
dent rate. The results indeed support our hypothesis
showing a significant difference between the I-OR and
the C-OR in perceived incident rate over time when pre-
test scores, age, gender, and job tenure were used as cov-
ariates. There was a decrease in perceived incident rate
in the I-OR (Figure 3) while perceived incident rate did
not change in the C-OR.
The number of reported incidents multiplied with a
factor 2.4 between the pre/post intervention period. In
the year before the intervention there were 250 reported
errors. Of these errors 80.8 % were classified as human,
8.8 % as technical, 9.6 % as organizational, and 0.8 % as
patient related. In the year after the intervention the
number of reported errors increased to 629 of which
were 83.9 % human, 3.7 % technical, 10.8 %
organizational, and 0.95 % patient related. The increase
in reported incidents was mainly due to an increase in
the number of reported near misses and errors. The de-
crease in the contribution of technical causes, referring
to physical items such as equipment, materials, instru-
mentation, installations, labels and forms, from 8.8 % to
3.7 % was significant (p= .001).
Table 4 Mean LOTICS scores and perceived incident rate
at pre-test compared for the I-OR and C-OR at post-test
(t-tests)
LRFs of LOTIC-scale I-OR C- OR t df P 95 % CI
n= 108 n= 97
Communication pre 2.43 2.61
post 2.38 2.57 -3.42 203 .001 -.306 -.082
Design pre 2.95 2.94
post 2.99 3.03 -.749 203 .455 -.028 .058
Maintenance pre 2.78 2.92
post 2.91 2.94 -.515 193 .607 -.143 .084
Material Resources pre 2.59 2.57
post 2.72 2.53 3.602 202 .000 .085 .290
Planning & Coordination pre 2.71 2.83
post 2.78 2.83 -.911 201 .363 -.143 .052
Teamwork pre 2.91 2.93
post 2.93 2.92 .160 201 .873 -.091 .107
Procedures pre 2.72 2.74
post 2.69 2.70 -.392 202 .696 -.103 .69
Situation Awareness pre 2.85 2.79
post 2.82 2.83 -.264 192 .792 -.143 .109
Team instructions pre 2.84 2.84
post 2.84 2.81 .565 190 . 573 -.087 .157
Training pre 2.67 2.82
post 2.81 2.82 -.228 203 .820 -.114 .091
Staffing Resources pre 2.71 2.81
post 2.84 2.73 1.989 203 .048 .001 .215
Perceived incident rate pre 3.97 3.98
post 3.59 3.96 -4.079 202 .000 -.551 -.192
Significant values are shown in bold.





The study shows that our intervention aimed at Mater-
ial resources, Training and Staffing resources resulted in
demonstrable changes of scores on two of the relevant
LOTICS scales. This type of intervention can provide
direct benefits to the staff of an OR, because the
changes on the working environment were both visible
and resulted in improvement in task performance and
are therefore likely to be accepted.
The philosophy underlying the development of the
LOTICS scale is that interventions should address broad
categories of error types (the underlying pathology) ra-
ther than individual symptoms. Given this approach, the
intervention aimed at improving material resources was
based on the concept of standardization. Standardization
is a concept well understood by other safety critical in-
dustries that value the benefit of lightening the mental
burden on staff and users to allow them to concentrate
better on the job at hand [30]. In aviation the
standardization and disciplined use of procedures,
termed SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) is widely
argued to be the most critical factor distinguishing be-
tween good and poor outcomes in aviation incidents
[31] and could be adapted to the OR to develop proto-
cols that minimize the influence of competing tasks and
high workload. Standardization of material and equip-
ment further results in the reduction of costs of oper-
ation, in maintenance, repair, storage, and simplified
issue procedures. As part of the process in I-OR to
standardize and streamline instrumentation and equip-
ment, including locations, old and/or less user-friendly
Table 5 Comparison of I-OR and C-OR by separate
univariate ANCOVAs (repeated measures) with pre-test
scores, age, gender and job tenure as covariates
LRFs of LOTIC-scale I-OR n=62 C- OR n=40 F ratio P
Communication pre 2.48 2.54 3.07 .083
post 2.35 2.54
Design pre 2.94 2.96 0.26 .872
post 2.99 2.95
Maintenance pre 2.81 2.98 2.43 .122
post 2.94 2.94
Material Resources pre 2.60 2.51 8.38 .005
post 2.73 2.50
Planning & Coordination pre 2.75 2.78 2.14 .147
post 2.83 2.73
Teamwork pre 2.93 2.86 .167 .684
post 2.95 2.86
Procedures pre 2.68 2.72 0.41 .525
post 2.66 2.70
Situation Awareness pre 2.84 2.71 1.90 .171
post 2.78 2.77
Team Instruction pre 2.87 2.75 0.73 .788
post 2.84 2.74
Training pre 2.72 2.77 1.61 .207
post 2.80 2.74
Staffing Resources pre 2.70 2.72 10.3 .002
post 2.81 2.58
Perceived Incident rate pre 3.93 3.96 5.45 .02
post 3.53 3.88






















Figure 1 Significant differences between I-OR (1) and C-OR (2) on pre and post-test scores: Staffing resources.






apparatus was replaced, missing items were purchased
and manuals with a uniform design were developed.
This improvement (at a general level) should and did
affect responses to specific test items referring to,
amongst others, the availability of equipment, their qual-
ity, timely repair and replacement. Moreover, after the
intervention PRISMA identified technical factors to be
significantly less important as causes of incidents.
Understaffing is one of the greatest threats to patient
safety. Staff are often the last layer of defence for any
error occurrence and particularly the proportion of pro-
fessional nursing staff has an effect on patient safety
[25,32,33]. At the time of the pre-test there were
shortages in OR personnel in 14 out of the 60 (23 %)
Dutch hospitals investigated [33]. One of the reasons for
understaffing in the Netherlands is that working in
healthcare is found to be less appealing [34,35]. To limit
turnover and to attract new personnel we need to en-
hance the attractiveness of the profession. To investigate
how this can be achieved we designed and evaluated a
number of intervention programs. These programs fo-
cused on the enhancement of well-studies work climate
characteristics: participation in decision making, job au-















































Figure 2 Significant differences between I-OR (1) and C-OR (2) on pre and post-test scores: Material resources.




these characteristics have been linked to various stres-
sors, and a number of individual and organizational out-
come variables [36]. In addition to the focus on work
climate characteristics more training opportunities were
created so that more trainees could be qualified. As
expected the interventions turned out to result in higher
scores in I-OR compared to C-OR on aspects like the
amount of staff to provide good care and the amount of
experienced staff.
Staff turnover rate in I-OR decreased from 9.4 % in
the year before the intervention to 5.1 % in the year after
the intervention. Although we realize that turnover is
determined by many factors, including labor market, it
is likely that some of this decline can be attributed to
the interventions.
Change can be a complex and drawn-out process that
depends on a variety of contextual factors. The OR is a
highly compartmentalized department structure which
brings together members from multiple disciplines
whose training and professional goals vary. Lack of com-
munication between operating room personnel is com-
mon [37]. Most surgical errors are not attributable to an
individual but involve multiple personnel and steps; ap-
proximately 43 % of errors are due to poor communica-
tion [20]. During the intervention in the OR we actually
saw an increase in reported problems with communica-
tion. When communication problems do occur, they are
found most often between different professional mem-
bers of a team, such as between anaesthesiologist and
surgeon or between nurses and doctors [38].The staff of
the I-OR indicated that they needed more information
to do their tasks. A tentative explanation for this result
could be that having created heightened awareness about
safety issues, the staff was more alert to the communica-
tion problems they experienced.
The importance of incident reporting is widely recog-
nized [10,39]. Unfortunately, reporting is grossly incom-
plete. After the intervention, incident reporting rates in
I-OR increased significantly compared with pre inter-
vention rates. We realize that it is difficult to deduce
from this result whether the 2.4x change in error report-
ing reflects a change in report behaviors with actual
rates remaining constant or whether the 2.4x change in
error reports reflects an increase in error rates despite
the intervention. Various studies, however, showed that
as an institution improves in the care it delivers and its
safety culture more problems may be reported since
open reporting is a tenet of safe practice [40]. Increased
incident reporting rates may not be indicative of an un-
safe organization, but may reflect a shift in organizational
culture [41]. In this context it is important to note that
the total number of reported incidents more than
doubled while the contribution of technical factors to in-
cident causation remained constant.
The propensity to report is probably further strength-
ened in our study by the implementation of the elec-
tronic report system. Various studies showed that an
accessible and easy to use reporting system [42], the
understanding that the reports will be handled in a non-
punitive manner [43], and the notion that the reports
are taken seriously and will lead to enhanced learning
and systematic changes which will prevent it from recur-
ring [44], positively affects the willingness to report inci-
dents. The empirical findings in this and other studies,
taken as a whole, suggest that our result, an increase in
incident reporting in I-OR, reflects a change in report
behaviors rather than an increase in incident rates.
We believe that this work can contribute to patient
safety initiatives and research in two ways: (1) our ex-
perience provides detailed insight in the latent risk fac-
tors, (2) our findings suggest that the methodology used
in the study shows promise as a method for evaluating
changes in the quality and safety of care in the operating
rooms. Changing culture is a new watchword in patient
safety [45]. The willingness of staff to speak up about a
patient-safety concern is an important part of safety in
the operating room [46]. Therefore there needs to be a
culture of openness [47]. We think a first step is this ap-
proach is to build a strong foundation of safety aware-
ness among your staff and this may best be done by
implementing concrete and visible improvements. We
think staff perceptions of safety are a high priority issue
within the OR, which will eventually motivate staff to
take greater ownership of and responsibility for patient
safety.
Limitation
In the present study the intervention addressing train-
ing did not result in a significant improvement. This
may have been due to a failure to address the problem
at a deeper level, that is, the deficiencies in the busi-
ness process behind the detected indicators. It is con-
ceivable that the intervention attacked the problem at a
‘symptom curing’ level the training of the use of new
equipment. As a result, this intervention may not have
remedied problems at a systemic level, as revealed by
the responses to test items referring to various other
aspects of the training procedure.
Safety questionnaires are increasingly used in health-
care for assessment of safety issues, but they differ in the
scope and extent. Sexton and co-workers developed a
safety attitudes questionnaire that was validated over a
wide range of clinical areas (ICU, OR, inpatient settings
and ambulatory clinics) and 3 countries and adminis-
tered to a large study group [48]. The factors identified
by their questionnaire were teamwork climate, safety cli-
mate, perception of management, job satisfaction, work-
ing conditions and stress recognition. They claim that






the results could be used to benchmark organizations
and to measure effectiveness of interventions. Similar
safety questionnaires have been used by others to access
teamwork and safety climate in hospitals and nursing
units [49,50].
Compared to their study our study was limited to a
smaller group of disciplines and settings. Furthermore
our questionnaire was more limited in scope and more
directed to a limited set of factors that we connected to
latent risk factors (LRFs), as identified in incident ana-
lysis. But a major difference is that those LRFs assessed
enabled a much more concrete identification of measures
for intervention, as compared with abstract factors like
the perception of management, job satisfaction and safety
climate, while still providing a way of assessing pre- and
post-intervention values. There is still much work
required before we are able to understand the full value
of using climate questionnaires in health care, as Prono-
vost and Sexton have [51] have recently pointed out.
Conclusion
The change of state of LRFs can be measured using a
patient safety questionnaire aimed at these factors. The
change of the relevant risk factors (material and staffing
resources) concurred with a decrease in perceived and
reported error rates in the relevant categories. We con-
clude that interventions aimed at unfavourable latent
risk factors detected by a questionnaire focussed at these
factors may contribute to the improvement of patient
safety in the OR.
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Current thinking about patient safety emphasizes the causal relationship 
between working conditions, hereinafter referred to as Latent Risk 
Factors (LRFs), and the quality of patient care. Breakdown of 
environmental (i.e., material and equipment), social (i.e., teamwork and 
communication) or organizational factors (i.e., training and procedures) 
have been reported to relate to errors that impact performance.1-3  
 
Research has shown that LRFs can also adversely affect employee health 
and well-being.4-7 A plausible account for such a relationship lies in action 
regulation theory, postulating that conditions in the environment that tax 
regulation capacity can lead to regulation problems in attaining task-
related goals.8 The anticipated or experienced threat that task-related 
goals can not be fulfilled may generate stress, leading to strain, 
dissatisfaction and/or other negative outcomes. 
 
Most studies on LRFs and worker outcomes focused on the impact of only 
one or a few factors, for instance either teamwork9, work procedures10 or 
communication.11 Consequently, little is known about the relative 
importance of LRFs to employee health and well-being. In addition, 
research on this topic among anaesthesia teams is scarce, and has 
focused primarily on anaesthetists.6;9 Gaining a better understanding of 
the extent to which LRFs impact on the well-being of anaesthesia staff is 
worthwhile, because the Operating Theatre is known to be a safety-
critical as well as stressful environment.2;9 
 
The aim of this study was to examine the relationship of various LRFs to 
job satisfaction, job stress and intention to leave among anaesthetists, as 
well as for trainees in anaesthesia and nurse anaesthetists. Considering 
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the differences in work practices, goals, priorities and behaviours 
 
 51 
between the different professions of the anaesthesia team, we 
hypothesized that LRFs are perceived differently by these professions and 
that the LRFs predictive of the outcome variables vary depending on 
profession. 
Methods 
Sample and procedure 
The study was approved by the Research Ethics Board (LUMC, Leiden, 
The Netherlands). Specialist anaesthetists, trainee anaesthetists and 
nurse anaesthetists from three university hospitals in the Netherlands 
were approached and invited to participate in the study. 
 
Excluded were participants who had an internship outside their 
workplace. Postal questionnaires were sent to their work address. A pre-
paid response envelope and a letter to explain the purpose of the study 




The respondents provided information about the following demographic 
variables: gender (1 = men, 2 = women), age (in years), working hours 
(in hours), and years in current hospital (1 < 1 year, 2 = 1 – 5 years, 3 = 
6 – 10 years, 4 > 10).  
 
Independent Variables 
Latent Risk Factors were measured with the Leiden Operating Theatre 
and Intensive Care Safety (LOTICS) scale that captures various workplace 
barriers to safe work practices and safety-critical interpersonal aspects of 
performance. The LOTICS has been validated with respect to factor 
structure and reliability of the scales, as well as its content and 
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discriminative validity.12 In this study, the following LRFs were measured: 
Training, Access to Information, Planning & Coordination, Teamwork, 
Team Instruction, Situational Awareness, Hierarchy, Material Resources, 
Maintenance, and Procedures (Table 1).  Items, presented as statements, 
were indicators of either potential problems or good practice. 
Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed with each 
statement on a 4-point scale (1=agree completely, 4=disagree 
completely). The same scale structure was presented throughout the 
questionnaire, and then adjusted post-hoc.  
 
 
Table 1: Latent Risk Factors (LRFs), number of scale items, scale’s alpha, 
and example items. 
 
Training (6 items,  α=.77) In my department, people have sufficient  
knowledge of new medical technological  
developments 
Access to Information (6 items, 
α=.84) 
Information to perform procedure available  
at the time when it is needed 
Planning & Coordination (4 items, 
α=.75) 
Lack of advance planning  
within the department 
Teamwork (4 items, α=.74) There is an adequate exchange of information 
during  
the operative procedure 
Team Instruction (4 items, α=.80) In my department, staff have the necessary  
professional skills 
Situational Awareness (3 items, 
α=.77) 
There is sufficient information exchange  
during the operative procedure 
Hierarchy (5 items,  α=.82) In my department, staff don’t always  
dare to ask for an explanation 
Material Resources (6 items, 
α=.75) 
Material/equipment is of insufficient quality 
Maintenance (4 items, α=.81) Maintenance inspections are carried  
out on time 
Procedures (7 items, α=.79) In my department, procedures, rules,  
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There were three dependent variables.  
Job satisfaction, indicating positive feelings that workers have regarding 
their job or facets of their job, which was assessed with the Job 
Satisfaction scale of the Leiden Quality of Work Questionnaire (3 items, 
α=.82; e.g., ‘‘I am satisfied with my job’’).13  
• Job stress, which was measured with a modified version of a stress 
assessment form.14 The items tapped into a person’s feelings of job-
related tension and anxiety (4 items, α=.89; e.g., “I regularly feel too 
stressed to do my work well”).  
• Intention to leave, which was measured with two items (α=.72; e.g. 
“I consider getting another job outside this organisation”).  
Responses were given on a 4-point rating scale (1=agree not at all, 
4=agree completely). Higher scores indicated higher job satisfaction, 
higher job stress and higher intention to leave.  
 
Statistical analysis 
The returned questionnaires were analysed using SPSS® version 17 
(Chicago, Illinois, USA). For all LRFs, negatively formulated items were 
recoded so that a higher score always indicates less favourable perceptions 
about working conditions. Scale scores were generated by averaging the 
ratings of all items that were part of the scale. The interne liability of the 
scales was assessed by calculating Cronbach’s alpha. To calculate the 
percentage frequency of responses to each item, responses on agree 
completely and agree have been combined, as have those on disagree 
completely and disagree. For all LRF scales the distribution of scores was 
found normal. One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to 
compare mean scores on LRFs, outcome variables and base-line 
characteristics (age, time in job, and working hours) across profession. 
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Post-hoc tests were conducted to examine specific differences between 
responses to the questionnaire scales. Chi-squared tests were used to 
compare mean scores across profession for gender. Bivariate correlations 
were calculated to examine the pattern of direct relationships between 
base-line characteristics, LRFs and outcome variables. In order to analyse 
the unique contribution that LRFs made to staff’s job satisfaction, job 
stress, and intention to leave, regression analyses were performed. In each 
of these analyses base-line characteristics, which significantly correlated 
with the outcome variable, were included as controls in Step 1. 
Results 
The study group consisted of 109 specialist anaesthetists, 46 trainees in 
anaesthesia and 115 nurse anaesthetists. The overall response rate was 
62% (270/438). Profession demographics are provided in Table 2. 
Compared with anaesthetists and nurses, trainees were younger and had 
the fewest number of years’ experience in the hospital. Nurses worked 
fewer hours than anaesthetists and trainees. There were more female 
nurses and female trainees than female anaesthetists. 
 
Table 2: Demographics and response rate by profession: Anaesthetists, 







 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age 44.8 (9.03) a 31.6 (2.96) ab 40.2 (10.21) b 
Time in job 2.8 (.096) a 1.9 (0.90) ab 2.8 (.085) ab 
Working hours 42.3 (6.10) a 46.3 (2.95) b 32.6 (8.37) ab 
Gender    
Men N( %) 72 (69%) ab 23 (52%) a 40 (38%) b 
Woman N(%) 37 (31%) ab 21 (48%) a 75 (62%) b 
Response rate 67 % 56 % 72 % 
Means that share an identical superscript differ significantly (p<0.05) by the 
Bonferroni procedure.  
Note: Time in job 1= < 1 year, 2= 1-5 years, 3= 6-10 years, 4> 10 year;  
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Perception of job satisfaction and intention to leave differed between 
professions (Table 3). Post-hoc analyses showed that nurses were less 
satisfied with their job than anaesthetists and trainees. Trainees had a 
lower intention to leave their job than anaesthetists and nurses.  The 
difference in job stress between professions was not significant. However 
there was a significant difference in stress between men and women 
anaesthetists, mean values respectively 1.64 vs.1.83 (P=.030), with 
women reporting higher stress levels than men. 
 
Table 3:  Mean job satisfaction, stress, intention to leave and Latent Risk 
Factors scale scores with F values of the ANOVA for each LRF by 
profession: Anaesthetists, Trainees in anaesthesia and Nurse anaesthesists. 





 N=109 N=46 N=115 
 
Dependent variables mean mean mean F 
Job satisfaction 2.88 a 2.97 b 2.65 ab 6.983 * 
Stress  1.77 1.86 1.76 .350 
Intention to leave  2.39 a 1.92 ab 2.35 b 7.748 * 
Latent Risk Factors     
Training 2.16 a  2.23  2.29 a  8.61*** 
Access to Information 2.28 a 2.41 b 2.65 ab 26.14*** 
Planning & Coordination 2.20 a 2.19 b 2.38 ab 6.78** 
Teamwork 1.96a 1.86 b 2.13 ab 8.62*** 
Team Instruction 2.16 a 2.14 b 2.38 ab 9.74*** 
Situational Awareness 2.08 a 2.22 2.32 a 7.69** 
Hierarchy 2.16 a 2.15 b 2.36 ab 8.40*** 
Material Resources 2.02 a 2.00 b 2.23 ab 7.94**  
Maintenance 1.81 a 1.89 1.99 a 6.64** 
Procedures 2.22a 2.18b 2.38 ab 5.54** 






Table 3 and 4 illustrate the perceptions of Latent Risk Factors for the 
three groups.  
Perceptions of LRFs differed between profession, with nurses reporting 
more problems on every LRF than anaesthetists and/or trainees.  Over 
70% of nurses rated Access to information, Training, Planning & 
coordination and Quality of procedures as poor and perceived the 
Hierarchy in the operating room as strict. Access to information and 
Quality of procedures were perceived as poor by more than 60% of 
anaesthetists and trainees.  In addition, over 60% of trainees reported 
unfavorably on the quality of Training. 
 
Table 4:  Percentages of disagreement on Latent Risk Factors by 










 N=109 N=46 N=115 
Latent Risk Factors % % % 
Training 48 64 73 
Access to Information 61 78 90 
Planning & Coordination 48 54 74 
Teamwork 28 16 40 
Team Instruction 42 40 64 
Situational Awareness 30 46 46 
Hierarchy 56 44 73 
Material Resources 39 25 55 
Maintenance 17 16 24 




Of the demographic variables, gender correlated significantly to stress for 
anaesthetists (.26 P<.005) and working hours correlated significantly to 
stress for trainees (.46 P<.001). 
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As can be seen in Table 5, for each of the professions, job satisfaction 
was moderately to highly correlated with intention to leave. For 
anaesthetists and nurses, but not for trainees, job stress correlated 
slightly, but significantly, with job satisfaction and moderately with 
intention to leave. All significant correlations were in the expected 
direction. 
 
For anaesthetists there was a moderate to strong relationship between 
the LRFs and job satisfaction (Table 5). The same pattern of relationships 
largely holds true for the other two groups. For nurses LRFs were 
generally moderately correlated with job satisfaction, except Material 
Resources. For trainees LRFs were generally moderately correlated with 
job satisfaction, except Access to Information, Team Instruction, 
Situational Awareness and Material Resources.  In comparison with job 
satisfaction, of the correlations between LRFs and the other outcomes 
stress and intention to leave, a smaller proportion was significant, with 
associations ranging from weak to moderate. All significant correlations 




Table 5: Correlations by profession with job satisfaction, job stress and 
intention to leave and LRFs 
 





 job sat stress int. to 
leave 
job sat stress int. to 
leave 
job sat stress int. to 
leave 
Job 
satisfaction          
Job stress -.255*   .012   -.328**   
Intention 
to leave 
-.612** .469**  .419* .069  -.541** .360**  
LRFs  
Training -.420** .031 .241* -.529** .040 .455** -.459** .218* .278* 
Access to 
Inform. 
-.464** -.096 -.151 -.255 .001 .235 -.434** .158 .333** 
Planning & 
Coord. 
-.696** .094 .352** -.356* .064 .509** -.308** .122 .195 
Teamwork -.611** .265* .374** -.480** .270 .304 -.460** .219* .304** 
Team 
Instruction 
-.502** .175 .082 -.260 .128 .210 -.490** .133 .225* 
Sit.  
awareness 
-.370** .072 .213 -.174 -.071 -.093 -.332** .134 .392** 
Hierarchy -.638** .096 .469** -.403** .324 .533** -.406** .409** .262* 
Material 
Resources 
-.351** .261* .190 -.166 .391* .084 -.149 -.014 .089 
Maintenanc
e 
-.278** .130 .095 -.397** .385* .094 -.251** -.013 .054 
Procedures -.397** .301** .277* -.337** .223 .290 -.355** .259* .345** 





The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 6. 
Inspection of this table reveals that, generally, the LRFs account for 






Table 5: Correlations by profession with job satisfaction, j b stres  and
intention o leave and LRFs 
 





 job sat stress int. to 
leave 
j b sat s ress int. to 
leave 
j b sat stress int. to 
leave 
Job 
satisfac on          
Job stress -.255*   .012   -.328**   
Intention 
to leave 
-.612** .469**  .419* .069  -.541** .360**  
LRFs  
Training -.420** .031 .241* -.529** .040 .455** -.459** .218* .278* 
Access to 
Inform. 
-.464** -.096 -.151 -.255 .001 .235 -.434** .158 .333** 
Planning & 
Coord. 
-.696** .094 .352** -.356* .064 .509** -.308** .122 .195 
Teamwork -.611** .265* .374** -.480** .270 .304 -.460** .219* .304** 
Team 
Instruction 
-.502** .175 .082 -.260 .128 .210 -.490** .133 .225* 
Sit.  
awareness 
-.370** .072 .213 -.174 -.071 -.093 -.332** .134 .392** 
Hierarchy -.638** .096 .469** -.403** .324 .533** -.406** .409** .262* 
Material 
Resources 
-.351** .261* .190 -.166 .391* .084 -.149 -.014 .089 
Maintenanc
e 
-.278** .130 .095 -.397** .385* .094 -.251** -.013 .054 
Procedures -.397** .301** .277* -.337** .223 .290 -.355** .259* .345** 





The results of the regression analyses ar  presented in Table 6. 
Inspection of this table rev als that, generally, the LRFs account for 






Table 5: Correlations by profession with job satisfaction, job stress and 
intention to leave and LRFs 
 





 job sat stress int. to 
leave 
job sat stress int. to 
leave 
job sat stress int. to 
leave 
Job 
satisfaction          
Job stress -.255*   .012   -.328**   
Intention 
to leave 
-.612** .469**  .419* .069  -.541** .360**  
LRFs  
Training -.420** .031 .241* -.529** .040 .455** -.459** .218* .278* 
Access to 
Inform. 
-.464** -.096 -.151 -.255 .001 .235 -.434** .158 .333** 
Planning & 
Coord. 
-.696** .094 .352** -.356* .064 .509** -.308** .122 .195 
Teamwork -.611** .265* .374** -.480** .270 .304 -.460** .219* .304** 
Team 
Instruction 
-.502** .175 .082 -.260 .128 .210 -.490** .133 .225* 
Sit.  
awareness 
-.370** .072 .213 -.174 -.071 -.093 -.332** .134 .392** 
Hierarchy -.638** .096 .469** -.403** .324 .533** -.406** .409** .262* 
Material 
Resources 
-.351** .261* .190 -.166 .391* .084 -.149 -.014 .089 
Maintenanc
e 
-.278** .130 .095 -.397** .385* .094 -.251** -.013 .054 
Procedures -.397** .301** .277* -.337** .223 .290 -.355** .259* .345** 





The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 6. 
Inspection of this table reveals that, generally, the LRFs account for 







 The LRFs accounted for a significant proportion of variance in job 
satisfaction, job stress and intention to leave. The equation shows that 
job satisfaction was most strongly related to Planning & Coordination and 
Hierarchy. Gender was a significant correlate of stress and remained 
statistically significant after controlling for the LRFs, with women 
reporting higher job stress than men.  Procedures, Material Resources 
and Access to Information were most strongly related to job stress.  
Hierarchy and Team Instructions were most strongly related to intention 
to leave. Access to Information and Team Instructions both had a 
negative beta coefficient (but a positive zero-order correlation), indicating 
that these variables act to suppress variance in the equation.  
 
Trainees in anaesthesia 
The LRFs accounted for a significant proportion of variance in job 
satisfaction, but not in job stress and intention to leave. The equation 
shows that job satisfaction was most strongly related to Training, and 
Maintenance. Working hours was a significant correlate of stress and 
remained statistically significant after controlling for the LRFs, with 
trainees working more hours per week reporting lower job stress than 
trainees working fewer hours per week.  
 
Nurse anaesthetists 
The LRFs accounted for a significant proportion of variance in job 
satisfaction, job stress and intention to leave. Job satisfaction was most 
strongly related to Maintenance, Access to Information, Teamwork and 
Hierarchy. Hierarchy was most strongly related to job stress, while 




Table 6: Multiple regression analyses predicting job satisfaction, job 
stress and intention to leave from demographics and LRFs for 
Anaesthetists, Trainees in anaesthesia and Nurse anaesthetists. The table 
shows the significant β and model R2.  
 
Anaesthetists Model β R2 
Planning & Coordination -.42*** Job satisfaction 
Hierarchy  -.25* 
63 
Gender .32* 
Procedure quality .36* 
Material resources .33* 
Job-related stress 
Access to Information -.31* 
33 
Team instruction -.40** Intention to leave  
Hierarchy .43** 
41 
Trainees in anaesthesia 
Training -.46 * Job satisfaction 
Maintenance -.39 * 
56 
 
Job-related stress  Working hours -.47 * 22 
Nurse anaesthetists 
Teamwork -.21* 





Job-related stress Hierarchy .40** 22 
Intention to leave Situational awareness 
 
.29* 26 
* p <.05; ** p <01; *** p<001. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, the relationships between Latent Risk Factors 
(LRFs) and well-being in anaesthesia teams of three university hospitals 
in the Netherlands were investigated. Generally, the results indicate that 
the outcomes of interest are predicted rather well by the LRFs. In safety 
research it has been argued that by controlling LRFs human error can be 
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research it has been argued that by controlling LRFs human error can be 
controlled.1 Our results suggest that when LRFs are controlled for, they 
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can also positively influence anaesthesia staff job satisfaction, job stress 
and intention to leave. 
In line with our first hypothesis we found that the different groups of 
anaesthesia staff have differing perceptions of the LRFs, with nurse 
anaesthetists reporting more unfavourably on each of the LRFs than the 
other professionals. Most studies on safety issues in anaesthesia have 
focused on anaesthetists, but the results of the present study suggest 
that, in addition to anaesthetists, other anaesthesia team members 
should be included in studies to get a valid impression of the theatre 
room’s safety health. Despite the difference between the groups in their 
overall rating of the LRFs, they were rather similar regarding their relative 
scores on LRFs: all three professions signalled the most problems with 
the information flow within the hospital and the protocols and guidelines 
and signalled the least problems with teamwork and the maintenance 
system. 
 
In line with our second hypothesis we found that the LRFs predictive of 
the outcomes variables differ between the members of the anaesthesia 
team. Poor planning & coordination had the most negative effect on 
anaesthetists’ job satisfaction. This result is in line with earlier studies 
showing that perceived lack of control over work and time planning is one 
of anaesthetists’ major sources of stress.4;15;16 To increase anaesthetists’ 
job satisfaction probably means finding ways of restoring a sense of 
control over their own time and planning. High control not only leads to 
positive outcomes such as job satisfaction, but also acts as an important 
resource, respectively regulation possibility, for countering the negative 
consequences of a stressful working life.17;18 Increased control over the 





For anaesthetists poor material resources emerged as an important 
predictor for higher job stress. Poor material resources place high 
demands on the performance of staff in high-performance working 
environments such as the theatre room. One way to facilitate material 
resources is to minimize the amount of variation in equipment.  Higher 
job stress in anaesthetists was also related to poor procedures.  It is 
important for anaesthetists in stressful situations to be able to rely on 
best practice.21 22 However, poor procedures (i.e. not easily accessible, 
long, complex, rigid, or coming in different versions) make it hard to fulfill 
required tasks and may even necessitate deviation from the rules to 
guarantee safe and successful performance.  We also found that gender 
was a predictor for stress in anaesthesists. Women reported more job 
stress symptoms than men. This result is in line with previous studies. 4;6 
 
A culture which makes it difficult to speak up, to voice one’s opinion or to 
ask questions if there is something one does not understand was an 
important predictor of lower levels of job satisfaction in anaesthetists and 
nurse anaesthesists. Also higher intention to leave in anaesthetists and 
higher job stress in nurse anaesthetists were related to a strong 
hierarchy. The willingness to leave the job strongly depended on the 
presence of conflicts with superiors and co-workers (our hierarchy), low 
job control (our planning & coordination) and job dissatisfaction. 23 Our 
findings highlight the importance of the creation of an open and safe 
environment for interactions, not only for safety purposes as has been 
shown in previous studies 24, but also for the well-being of the 
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The importance of ‘non-technical’ skills for safety, like teamwork and 
situational awareness, has been well recognized and received more 
attention on anaesthesia in recent years.11;25 We found that the 
importance of ‘non-technical’ skills for well-being is most evident in nurse 
anaesthetists. Poor teamwork lowered their job satisfaction while lower 
levels of situational awareness increased their intention to leave. Active 
involvement of these members in the progress of the operation helps 
them to develop knowledge, insight, and experience that enhance their 
understanding and control of the situation and their opportunity for 
learning. Lack of development opportunities can lead to disengagement 
because it undermines employee motivation and learning.26 Lower levels 
of job satisfaction in nurse anaesthetists were also related to poor access 
of information. Obtaining timely and adequate information from others is 
crucial for nurse anaesthetists to carry out job demands. When the 
environment does not provide access to information needed to carry out 
job demands workers feel powerless. One way to boost nurses’ job 
satisfaction is a clear structure for the transmission of information27  Poor 
maintenance emerged as another important predictor of lower job 
satisfaction in nurse anaesthesists. The perception that the maintenance 
system is working in a way that material and equipment is being 
maintained before it fails, and thus the system reduces unexpected 
failures and increases safety, builds employees’ trust in management and 
their confidence about their abilities to handle their work environment 
and job tasks.  
 
Hours worked per week turned out to be crucial for trainee’s anaesthetists 
job stress. The fewer hours’ trainees reported working per week, the 
greater the job stress they experienced. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that working fewer hours compromises clinical exposure. Studies 
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showed that reduced working hours potentially reduce teaching and 
supervision for interns.28 29 To reduce the stress levels of trainees with 
fewer working hours, a supportive environment and various stress 
management strategies may help. An important factor for trainees’ job 
satisfaction actually is receiving training. Trainee anaesthetist felt less 
satisfied with their job when training opportunities were not fully utilised, 
e.g., poor clinical supervision, few task specific training activities, and 
reduced time for specialty training. Training has been shown to increase 
the ability to solve problems, particularly for inexperienced professionals.30 
Poor maintenance emerged as another important predictor of lower job 
satisfaction in trainees. This is possibly due to the fact that in a training 
situation, employees must have confidence in the structure of the 
environment. 
 
This study has some limitations. A point of concern is that the sample 
only included anaesthesia staff working in three university hospitals in the 
Netherlands. The experience of participants in these hospitals may differ 
from those in other hospitals or indeed in other countries. Future 
research needs to test the hypotheses across a wider sample, including 
peripheral hospitals, to see if the present findings can be confirmed.  
The sample size is also small, particularly for trainees. Therefore, 
research studies with much larger size would be required to ensure 
appropriate generalization of the findings of the study. Although the 
response rate (62%) is acceptable for a postal survey, future research 
also needs to aim for a higher response rate.  
In this research we included a substantial number of LRFs. However, it is 
conceivable that in addition to the studied set of LRFs other factors may 
contribute to the outcomes under investigation, such as staffing 5 
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housekeeping 31 and financial rewards 32 Future research may consider 
incorporating these factors. 
 
Finally, due to the study’s cross-sectional design, the analyses cannot 
provide a definite answer concerning the directions of the relationships. 
The results of this study are therefore suggestive in nature and are 
meant to give first indications. Longitudinal research is clearly needed to 
identify causal links in the relations between LRFs and well-being.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings of this study suggest that 
unfavourable LRFs can act as stressful triggers at the workplace. If 
anaesthesia staff cannot control such stress this may negatively affect 
their well-being. The key to a healthy workplace seems to be to control 
the deficiencies in the structure of the work environment. Therefore, we 
call for intervention studies to test whether or not improving LRFs does 
affect job satisfaction, job stress and intention to leave of anaesthesia 
team members positively. 
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Safety in hospitals and complex environments such as the Operating 
Theatre and the Intensive Care Unit rely on multiple system defences 
such as the organizational structure, protocols, the training received by 
the professionals and the quality of equipment or technology. Of 
particular interest are how medical errors occur, how they can be 
addressed within the health care system and how the work environment 
affects medical errors and near misses. There is increasing acceptance of 
the idea that adverse outcomes are often due to system failures, whereby 
deficiencies at many different levels create the context in which human 
error can have a negative impact.1-3 Organizational factors, which may 
contribute to errors and to safety, can be grouped together into a limited 
number of general failure classes or Latent Risk Factors (LRFs). LRFs are 
error-producing conditions such as poor design, maintenance failures, 
unworkable procedures, deficiencies in training, equipment design and 
use as well as poor team coordination.4  Safety experts argue that 
proactively reducing such LRFs will result in the delivery of safer care 
more quickly than taking measures directed, often reactively, at specific 
providers of care. 
 
Patient safety varies across institutions, within institutions and between 
disciplines.5-8 9 One dimension along which it can vary is the clinical area, 
such as the Operating Theatre (OT) or Intensive Care Unit (ICU). A 
proactive system approach to patient safety suggests that it is necessary 
to study all aspects of the system that comprises an operation or ICU 
hospitalization.10;11 Most studies focus on the impact of a limited set of 
factors, for instance either teamwork6, work procedures12 or 
communication.13 Consequently, little is known about the relative 
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Anaesthetists do not work independently from others. Their performance 
is embedded in organizational factors. Different disciplines in the 
Operating Theatre may have different work norms and the pace of their 
work may vary.14  Surgeons, anaesthetists and critical care physicians 
seem more satisfied with physician–nurse collaboration than nurses.15;16  
Nurses are less likely to agree that they were provided with adequate 
training to do the job than surgeons.17 Physicians’ views of the 
contribution of guidelines to safety and to clinical practice differ from 
those of nurses.17-20 Thus it would be likely that interdisciplinary 
differences may exist in the perception of patient safety.  
 
The aim of the present study is to test for differences in perceptions of 
Latent Risk Factors and to explore the contribution of disciplines and 
clinical area (Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Unit). Identification of 
differences between clinical area and disciplines allow the measures 
aimed at LRFs that are below standard to be specifically tailored. Tailoring 
is necessary because correction of the various LRFs would require entirely 
different preventive actions.21 The advantage of identifying these 




Sample and procedure 
The study was approved by the Research Ethics Board. We chose to 
investigate the clinical area of the Operating Theatre (OT) and Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU). Both the OT and the ICU are dynamic environments, 
where there is a wide variety of high-technology equipment, constant 
change and time stress. There is a considerable risk of error in these 
departments. The study was performed at four university hospitals in the 
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Netherlands. We asked hospitals, where another safety program was 
currently implemented, to participate in a safety program. That is why 2 
ICUs were incorporated in the study. The study design is presented in 
Figure 1. Clinicians, trainees and nursing staff were included in the study, 
if they had been in their job for more than three months. Disciplines 
included anaesthetists, anaesthesia nurse-technicians*, recovery nurses, 
surgeons, theatre nurses*, intensivists, intensive care nurses (IC nurses), 
and trainees anaesthesia nurse-technicians /theatre nurses (Trainees A-T 
nurses). 
 
Figure 1:  design of the study 
 
Base-line characteristics 
The following four demographic variables were used as control variables: 
gender (1 = male, 2 = female), age (in years), working hours 
(contractual hours per week), and length of service in the job (1 = < 1 
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The approach taken to assessing the state of the individual LRFs is 
analogous to a health check, which measures a limited number of well-
chosen diagnostic vital signs. Items, presented as statements, can be 
indicators of either potential problems or good practice.  
 
In the current study, LRFs were measured using the Leiden Operating 
Theatre & Intensive Care Safety (LOTICS) scale, which has been 
validated with respect to factorial structure and reliability of the scales, as 
well as its content and discriminative validity. 22  It measures 12 LRFs 
with a total of 55 indicator questions: training, task related 
communication, planning & coordination, design, maintenance, 
equipment resources, teamwork, team instruction, housekeeping, 
situational awareness, hierarchy and procedures.  Items, presented as 
statements, were indicators of either potential problems or good practice 
(Appendix 1). Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed 
with each statement on a 4-point scale (1=disagree completely, 4=agree 




The returned questionnaires were analysed using SPSS® version 17 
(Chicago, Illinois, USA). For all LRFs, negatively formulated items were 
recoded so that a higher score always indicates more favourable 
perceptions on that LRF. Scale scores were generated by averaging the 
ratings of all items that were part of the scale. To calculate the 
percentage frequency of responses to each item, responses on agree 
completely and agree were combined, as were those on disagree 
completely and disagree. 
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The study sample was divided according to clinical area: OT vs. ICU and 
according to disciplines. One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were 
used to compare mean scores and base-line characteristics (age, working 
hours and current years in the job). Chi-squared tests were used to 
compare mean scores across discipline for gender.  
To test for differences in perceptions of LRFs by clinical area and 
discipline, we used ANOVA, as there were differences in age, working 
hours, and length of service in the job, they were used as covariates. 
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the pattern of 
direct relationships between LRFs and clinical area and discipline.  
Results 
The overall response rate was 64% (768 out of 1260 questionnaires). 
The response rate ranged by hospital (62%- 65%) by clinical area (62 % 
- 68%) and by disciplines (62-69%). Respondents were predominantly 
female 71% with a mean age of 40.32 (F (3,760) =8.71 p=.000). 
Respondents had been in their job an average for more than 8 years 
(mean 2.77, F (3,760) =2.97 p=.019). Respondents worked on average 
33.14 hours a week (F (3,760=8.97 p=.000). Significant differences 
between disciplines were found in age, working hours, length of service in 
the job and gender (Table 1).   
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Anaesthetists 66% 121 41.40 43.50 2.66 63 27 
Anaesthesia nurse-
technicians 64% 114 40.23 32.00 2.82 35 65 
Recovery nurses 66% 99 46.06 26.99 2.78 19 81 
Intensivists 69% 26 41.81 42.88 2.23 62 28 
I.C. nurses 62% 111 41.10 30.73 2.84 27 73 
Surgeons 62% 26 46.08 44.38 3.36 80 20 
Theatre nurses 66% 216 40.20 28.90 2.97 1 99 
Trainees AT nurses 65% 56 23.71 35.53 1.89 1 99 




Demographics and LRFs 
We compared demographic variables with LRFs. There was a significant 
differences for age with design of equipment (F (3,760) =7.60 p=.04). 
Younger staff had a somewhat more favourable perception of design. In 
the 18-25 age group the mean was 3.09 (sd.36) compared with the age 
group> 55 mean 2.95 (sd. 41).  
 
Staff with more working hours had also more favourable perceptions of 
design (F3, 761=6.08, p=. <001) and material resources (F3, 761=7.19 
p=<.001). Staff who have worked in the hospital for 5-10 years have less 






Clinical area: OT and ICU and LRFs 
Over 40-50% of the staff of the OT and ICU rated communication as 
poor. The ICU also rated equipment and housekeeping as poor (Table 2). 
Comparing OT and ICU, significant differences were found on training (F 
(1,750) =8.96 p=.003), communication (F(1,749) =5.37 p=.021), teamwork 
(F(1,750) =6.33 p=.012), team instruction (F(1,750) =7.88 p=.005) and 
hierarchy (F(1,750) =1610 p=.000). The OT had more favourable perception 
of design (F(1,750) =4.60 p=.032) and equipment (F(1,750) =22.05 p=.000). 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics of LRFs between clinical areas: 
Percentage (%) agreement and mean (sd) 
 
LRFs OT IC 
 % mean (sd) % mean (sd) 
Training 70 2.75 (.38)  88 2.86 (.33)  
Communication 44 2.76 (.33) 53 2.97 (.32) 
Planning & Coordination 76 2.48 (.43) 87 2.58 (.38) 
Design  91 3.00 (.38) 85 2.93 (.39) 
Equipment  75 2.86 (.42) 53 2.61 (.44) 
Maintenance 83 2.96 (.42) 83 2.92 (.34) 
Teamwork 90 2.99 (.36) 91 3.05 (.35) 
Team instruction 68 2.75 (.39) 75 2.83 (.34) 
Housekeeping 60 2.61 (.45) 56 2.60 (.33) 
Sit. awareness 84 2.85 (.40) 87 2.85 (.37) 
Hierarchy   79 2.75 (.42) 93 2.90 (.32) 
Procedures 72 2.73 (.35) 68 2.70 (.32) 
Mean score on a 1–4 scale, where 4 means agree strongly 
 
Disciplines and LRFs 
Anaesthetists, intensivists and surgeons had more favourable perceptions 
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Disciplines and LRFs 
Anaesthetists, intensivists and surgeons had more favourable perceptions 
of all LRFs, with exception of the anaesthetists for team instruction (49% 
 
 77 
of agreement) and communication (54% of agreement). Over 70% of the 
anaesthesia technicians rated communication and housekeeping as poor 
(Table 3).  
 
 




















Training 72 54 72 92 83 92 64 82 
Communication 49 30 46 92 46 68 37 49 
Planning & Co. 74 67 67 81 67 96 80 70 
Design  91 82 88 88 88 98 90 95 
Equipment  86 69 69 98 69 72 72 82 
Maintenance 93 82 81 98 80 68 81 81 
Housekeeping 79 33 61 75 61 92 59 68 
Teamwork 93 80 78 92 87 98 95 91 
Team instruct. 54 54 59 96 78 98 71 79 
Sit. awareness 79 71 72 77 72 75 95 80 
Hierarchy   76 74 64 92 64 96 85 67 
Procedures 90 72 66 69 66 84 78 79 
 
Significant differences on all LRFs were found for all disciplines. Surgeons, 
intensivists had more favourable perceptions than anaesthesia technicians 
and recovery nurses on instructions (F (7,757) =7.93 p=.000, Figure 1a). 
The same pattern was found for communication (F (7,756) =11. 03 
p=.000), planning & organisation (F (7,756) =9.72 p=.000), teamwork (F 





Figure 1a: Mean values and 95 CI of disciplines for:  Team instruction 
 
Intensivists and anesthetists had more favorable perceptions than IC 
nurses of equipment (F (7,749) =10.04 p=.000, Figure 1b) design (F (7,756) 




Figure 1a: Mean values and 95 CI of disciplines for:  Team instruction 
 
Intensivists and anesthetists had more favorable perceptions than IC 
nurses of equipment (F (7,749) =10.04 p=.000, Figure 1b) design (F (7,756) 
=3.54 p=.001) and maintenance of equipment (F (7,756) =7.76 p=.000) 
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Figure 1b: Mean values and 95 CI of disciplines for:  Equipment  
 
Intensivists and surgeons had more favourable perceptions than nurses of 
procedures (F (7,756) = 4.86 p=.000 figure 1c). The same pattern was seen 
for situational awareness (F (7,756) =8.24 p=.000) and housekeeping (F 
(7,756) =14.39 p=.000).  
 





Bivariate correlations were calculated to examine the pattern of 
relationships between clinical area, disciplines and LRFs. 
Correlations between clinical area and LRFs were significant and positive 
for material resources, design and situational awareness (Table 5). The 
strongest association was found with design (.148 p= <.01), hierarchy 
(.146 p= <.01) and equipment (.133 p=<.05).    
For disciplines, significant correlations were found for communication, 
planning & coordination, housekeeping, teamwork and team instruction. 
The strongest associations with disciplines were found for communication 
(.148 p= <.01) and housekeeping (.145 p= <.01). 
 
 






Training .074* .144** 
Communication .037 .148** 
Planning & Coordination -.001 .132** 
Design .148** .001 
Maintenance .094* -.035 
Equipment .133** -.047 
Teamwork .028 .097** 
Team instruction  .110 .135
** 
Housekeeping .017 .145** 
Situational awareness .113** .034 
Hierarchy .146** .078 
Procedures .010 .057 




Bivariate correlations were calculated to examine the pattern of 
relationships between clinical area, disciplines and LRFs. 
Correlations between clinical area and LRFs were significant and positive 
for material resources, design and situational awareness (Table 5). The 
strongest association was found with design (.148 p= <.01), hierarchy 
(.146 p= <.01) and equipment (.133 p=<.05).    
For disciplines, significant correlations were found for communication, 
planning & coordination, housekeeping, teamwork and team instruction. 
The strongest associations with disciplines were found for communication 
(.148 p= <.01) and housekeeping (.145 p= <.01). 
 
 






Training .074* .144** 
Communication .037 .148** 
Planning & Coordination -.001 .132** 
Design .148** .001 
Maintenance .094* -.035 
Equipment .133** -.047 
Teamwork .028 .097** 
Team instruction  .110 .135
** 
Housekeeping .017 .145** 
Situational awareness .113** .034 
Hierarchy .146** .078 
Procedures .010 .057 





In this study we focused on the influence of the clinical area (OT vs. ICU) 
and disciplines on reported scores in an inquiry on patient safety.  We 
examined the clinical areas of OT and ICU because these are areas where 
adverse events frequently occur. We observed that the ICU staff reported 
fewer problems for training, communication, team instruction and 
hierarchy. This could be the result of the process, which is entirely 
different to OT or ward work. The OT had more favourable perceptions of 
design and equipment. Poor equipment places high demands on the 
performance of staff in high-performance working environments.  For 
instance, good design reduces the need for extensive training in the use 
of equipment, whereas poor design may be only partially compensated 
for by extensive training. One way to facilitate equipment resources is to 
minimize the amount of variation in equipment. An explanation could be 
that the OT is a more standardized environment than the ICU. 
We found differences between disciplines on all Latent Risk Factors, 
which shed some light on differences between disciplines in their 
perception of patient safety. We speculate that this is the result of 
differences in work organization, content and professional training. One 
might expect that the perceptions of physicians and nurses are different 
because of their different expertise and work responsibilities.  
Three profiles between disciplines and LRFs were found. The 1st profile: 
Anaesthetists, anaesthesia nurse-technicians and recovery nurses had 
lower perceptions of communication, team instruction, teamwork and 
planning & organisation and hierarchy (non-technical skills).  Teamwork 
issues generally cluster around issues of miscommunication, lack of 
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coordination, failures in monitoring, and lack of team familiarity.23  
Communication and interaction between members of the anaesthesia 
team specifically have received less attention than communication in the 
Operating Theatre during surgery. In the Netherlands an anaesthesia 
team consists of an anaesthetist, frequently a trainee anaesthetist and an 
anaesthesia technician.24 In general, it is a challenge within the Operating 
Theatre to build functional teams.25 Usually these teams are just co-
incidentally formed, similar to airline crews. The teams consist of 
members of several different disciplines that work together for that 
particular operation or the whole operating day.  This task-oriented team 
model with high levels of specialization has historically focused on 
technical expertise and performance of members with little emphasis on 
interpersonal behaviour and teamwork. In this model, communication is 
informally learned and developed with experience.26 This places a 
substantial demand on the non-clinical skills of the team members, 
especially in high-demand situations like crises. 
The 2nd profile: We found that anaesthetists and intensivists had more 
favourable perceptions than surgeons of the technical LRFs (equipment, 
design and maintenance). IC nurses had the lowest perception of these 
LRFs. A low rate of equipment problems was found during anaesthesia, 
indicating that their procedures for checking and maintenance of 
equipment was adequate.27 Human error and lack of familiarity with 
equipment have been shown to be more common than ‘true’ equipment 
failure. 28Anaesthetists and intensivists work more with equipment, design 
and maintenance, which would explain why they are more familiar with 
these issues.  In their training they are therefore more exposed to 
deficiencies, which may be an explanation of why they perceived the 
technical skills more favourably. The low perception of IC nurses has to 
do with performance obstacles related to misplacement of equipment 
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coordination, failures in monitoring, and lack of team familiarity.23  
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related to inadequate workspace. Also the current devices at the ICU 
bedside do not adequately support a nurse's information-gathering 
activities.29 The performance obstacles related to misplacement of 
equipment may be eliminated by creating and reinforcing a protocol or by 
establishing a tracking system, the performance obstacle of inadequate 
workspace may require a major redesign of the physical layout of the 
ICU.30 
The 3rd profile: We found that nurses, especially anaesthesia nurse-
technicians and recovery nurses are more sensitive to procedures, 
housekeeping and situation awareness. Physicians and nurses hold 
divergent views regarding adherence to rules and clinical guidelines.18-20 
Nurses appear to hold more systematized and less individualistic 
conceptions of clinical work than physicians and appear to be more 
fastidious in adhering to documented procedures.17Anaesthesia nurse-
technicians often serve as controllers for the anaesthesia team by getting 
supplies and equipment ready for the anaesthetic procedure. They are 
confronted with non-availability of equipment, what explains why they 
perceived housekeeping as poor. 
The attitudes of healthcare disciplines towards the working conditions are 
a component of an organization's safety culture. An important and 
perhaps glaring gap in our knowledge of cultural assessment of safety 
relates to the sources of variation in the safety culture. We do not 
understand whether the variation in culture is explained by the clinical 
area or staff.  
 
We found a correlation between clinical areas, hierarchy and situation 
awareness (Figure 2). Hierarchy is more prevalent in high-intensity areas 
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as the theatre room, intensive care and emergency department.31 This 
may explain why hierarchy plays a role at the clinical level. 
Within hospitals technology use is steadily. In our study we found a 
correlation between the quality and availability of equipment and the 
clinical area. While technology has the potential to improve care, it is not 
without risks. It can cause significant harm if not adequately designed, 
regulated and maintained. Technology has been described as both part of 
the problem and part of the solution for safer health care. Organization of 
workflow around equipment and process is also vital. Given our findings it 
would be advisable that hospital procurement services apply a risk 
assessment and a risk management analysis prior to decisions involving 
new equipment in order to tailor measures to be taken for individual 
groups to minimize the risks of latent errors. Correlations with disciplines 
and LRFs were found on non- technical skills (Figure 2).  Our study 
supports the current view as to why much attention is paid to non-
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Figure 2: Overview of the significant correlations presented by clinical 
area, discipline and Latent Risk Factors 
 
 
Division of labour among multiple professions can provoke different views 
on safety. In our study we not only found differences between physicians 
and nurses but also differences within clinician and nursing specialties. 
Compared with other disciplines, the anaesthesia team also feels the 
safety deficiencies in the organizational infrastructure more acutely. The 
different tasks performed by the various disciplines could be an 
explanation of why they see only a certain aspect but not the whole 
picture (Figure 3). We therefore recommend that in the context of safety 
programs, all disciplines should be involved, not just single disciplines. 
Identification of differences between disciplines would allow the measures 
to be tailored. Identification of separate underperforming latent factors is 












Figure 3: Perspective of different disciplines on Latent Risk Factors 
 
Practical application of the findings 
The results of this study led to specific interventions on the OT and ICU. 
Anaesthetists, anaesthesia nurse-technician and recovery nurses had 
significant different results on communication and team instructions. 
Interviews with staff revealed that the results on these LRFs were based 
on a lack of information causing ambiguity in responsibility. One OT 
started with an intervention based on the introduction of a standardized 
handover protocol through the perioperatieve process and other OT 
started an intervention to promote the availability of procedures. The ICU 
had less favourable perception on equipment and design. Interviews with 
staff revealed that this was based on the different prototypes of 
equipment. Therefore, one ICU started an intervention to standardize 
equipment and supplies for all equipment development of manuals with a 
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There are limitations to our study. All data were cross-sectional, however 
a sampling bias remains possible, and some caution must be exercised in 
generalizing our study findings. Nurses comprise 79% of the study 
population, as they are the bulk of an ICU's and OR’s staff. Thus it is 
likely that nurses' perceptions of LRFs contribute most. Moreover, we 
have attributed differences in LRFs by disciplines, when they could also 
be explained by gender, age or length of service. That was the reason for 
including the demographics as covariate in the analyses. Another point of 
concern is that the sample only included staff working in university 
hospitals in the Netherlands. The experience of participants in these 
hospitals may differ from those in other hospitals or indeed in other 
countries. Future research needs to test the hypotheses across a wider 
sample, including peripheral hospitals, to see if the present findings can 
be confirmed.  
As health care has focused its safety efforts toward the system rather 
than towards the individual provider of care, organizational factors have 
emerged, known as Latent Risk Factors. Understanding how LRFs affect 
safety should enable us to design more effective control measures that 
will impact on the overall safety condition.   We would argue that 
systematic analyses and step-by-step improvements are feasible and can 
impact directly on the culture. Strategies for improving patient safety 
should be tailored specifically for clinical areas and disciplines. 
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Adequate coaching of new personnel  
Keeping employees informed about new medical /  
technological developments  
Training employees in the operation of new equipment  
Adequate supervision of trainees in their practical period 
Co-workers on my department have the necessary qualifications 
In OR combination of staff junior / junior are avoided / 
on the ICU an adequate mix of seniority is applied 
Communication 
 
Information about changes in OR program /  
planned procedure timely provided 
Information about changes in OR program / planned  
procedure are communicated through  the right channels 
Adequate communication about patients with other disciplines 
Information to perform procedure available at the time  
when it is needed  
Adequate communication about patients between teams  
Information to perform procedure not properly communicated 
Planning &  
Coordination 
 
Organizational changes not adequately supported  
within the department  
Lack of advance planning within the department 
Sufficiency of planning 
Design 
 
Equipment operation is difficult 
Controls or displays are hard to read 
Controls of displays are unclear and / or lacking 
Too much information on controls or display 
Equipment 
 
Following new technologies when procuring new equipment 
Availability of materials & equipment at the time it is needed 
Insufficient quality of materials & equipment 
Worn-out or faulty equipment replaced in a timely way 
Equipment frequently repaired 
Instruments often incomplete 
Maintenance  
 
Maintenance carried out on a regular basis  
Maintenance inspection performed timely 
OR / ICU equipment badly maintained 





I really feel I am a part of my team 
Team’s ability to deal with unexpected events 
Members of my team work together as a well  
coordinated team 




Team members debriefed on what they can expect  
during operation / shift 
Team members sufficiently instructed during operation / shift 




Team members alert each other to problems 
Members of my team know what one another is doing 
Members of my team monitor each others performance 
Adequate exchange of information during the operation / shift 
Housekeeping Materials are often stored haphazardly 
The working environment is always clean 
An optimal arrangement of equipment is often not possible 
 
Hierarchy In my department we listen to each others' opinion 
In my department, you can freely blessing that you  
disagree with anything  
In my department will be open to criticism that the  
work is concerned 
In my department employees do not always dare to  
ask for explanations 




Accessibility of procedures / regulations / rules  
Violations of procedures / regulations / rules 
Procedures / regulations / rules frequently not clear  
Procedures / regulations / rules frequently not applicable  
in practice 
Procedures / regulations / rules applied correctly 
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There is no “best” measure of safety. Safety is too multidimensional to be 
represented in a single score. It is also clear that measures taken to 
improve safety, when performed without due regard for the total context, 
are often ineffective and can even be detrimental. One man’s 
improvement may be another’s latent condition. Ideally safety should be 
embodied throughout the institution, minimizing possible latent causes 
that might combine to produce injury. This continuing search to improve 
safety with small incremental measures is very similar to the quality 
concept of continuous quality improvements. 
 
The safety of an organization can be improved by investigating and 
correcting the many processes that shape performance at the “sharp 
end”. Errors do not occur of themselves, but arise within the context of 
the work environment. Where the environment is one that makes errors 
by individuals more likely, we can identify the underlying problems that 
will have been present in the system, often recognized but long tolerated. 
The factors that make errors more likely, or more dangerous, can be 
characterized as Latent Risk Factors (LRFs). LRFs, that is, staffing, 
training, communication, planning & coordination, design, maintenance, 
equipment, teamwork, team instructions, housekeeping, situational 
awareness, hierarchy and procedures. Understanding how LRFs affect 
safety should enable us to design more effective control measures. 
Improving the recognized LRFs will tilt the safety balance in the 
advantageous direction. Recognition of their importance and acting to 
improve these factors will likely be more effective in improving safety 
than personally directed approaches.   
In chapter 2 a general overview of LRFs is given. Each one of these LRFs 
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why they form an appropriate level of description for the system-based 
approach, as opposed to the person approach that refers to individual 
performance factors such as skill or vigilance. 
 
In chapter 3 the development of the Leiden Operating Theatre Intensive 
Care Scale (LOTICS) is describes as an instrument to detect the 
underlying causes of medical errors proactively by measuring LRFs. In the 
prospective survey, items can be either indicators of either potential 
problems or good practice. It shows the strengths and weakness of an 
organization, allowing the possibility of data-driven interventions. 
Changes in patient safety performance can then be monitored and the 
effects of interventions to improve the level of patient safety can be 
evaluated. Similarly, LOTICS can be used for comparison of different 
hospital, clinical areas and disciplines within the medical system. 
 
In chapter 4 an approach to a successful implementation of a patient 
safety program is described in the Operating Theatre. The favourable 
change of the LRFs: material and staffing resources concurred with a 
decrease in perceived and reported error rates in the relevant categories. 
This type of intervention can provide direct benefits to the staff of an OT, 
because the changes on the working environment were both visible and 
resulted in improvement in task performance and are therefore likely to 
be accepted. 
 
In chapter 5 the relationships between Latent Risk Factors (LRFs) and 
well-being in anaesthesia teams of three university hospitals in the 
Netherlands were investigated. The results indicate that the job 
satisfaction, stress and intention to leave are predicted rather well by the 
LRFs. Importantly, this finding shows that unfavorable working conditions 
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not only result in potential hazards for patient safety, but also negatively 
affect employees’ job satisfaction, job stress and increase intention to 
leave the job. Most studies on safety issues in anaesthesia have focused 
on anesthetists, but the results of this study show that, in addition to 
anaesthetists, other anaesthesia team members should be included in 
studies to get a valid impression of the theatre room’s safety health. 
 
In chapter 6 we focused on the influence of the clinical area (Operating 
Theatre vs. Intensive Care Unit) and disciplines on reported scores in an 
inquiry on patient safety. We observed that the ICU staff reported fewer 
problems for training, communication, team instruction and hierarchy 
than the OT staff. This could be the result of the entirely different 
process, compared to OT or ward work. The OT had more favorable 
perception, on design and equipment resources. We found differences 
between disciplines on all Latent Risk Factors. We speculate that this is 




The prospective identification of Latent Risk Factors (LRFs) can lead to 
removal of error-inducing conditions before they can contribute to patient 
injury. Identifying LRFs will improve patient safety by improving the 
conditions that set the working environment for the occurrence of errors. 
Interventions aimed at unfavorable LRFs detected by the LOTICS, may 
contribute to the improvement of patient safety in the OT. This thesis has 
shown that staff from OT and ICU is able to detect these shortcomings 
but differ in their scope of the present risks. Unfavorable LRFs can act as 
stressful triggers at the workplace. If staff cannot control such stress this 
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may negatively affect their well-being. The key to a healthy workplace is 
to control the deficiencies in the structure of the working environment. 
 
The willingness of staff to speak up about a patient-safety concern is an 
important part of safety in the Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Unit. 
Therefore there needs to be a culture of openness. We think a first step 
in this approach is to build a strong foundation of safety awareness 
among staff. This may best be done by implementing concrete and visible 
improvements. We think staff perceptions of safety are a high priority 
issue within the Operating Theatre and Intensive Care Unit, which will 
eventually motivate staff to take greater ownership of and responsibility 

















Een goede maat voor patiëntveiligheid is moeilijk te geven. Patiëntveiligheid 
hangt van zoveel factoren af, dat het niet mogelijk is om deze in één getal te 
vangen. Het is duidelijk dat wanneer maatregelen om de veiligheid te 
verbeteren zonder inachtneming van de totale context worden ingevoerd, 
deze vaak niet effectief en zelfs schadelijk kunnen zijn. Idealiter moet 
veiligheid verbeterd worden op de werkvloer door het minimaliseren van 
latente oorzaken die in combinatie schade kunnen veroorzaken. De 
voortdurende zoektocht om met kleine stapsgewijze maatregelen de 
veiligheid te verbeteren, is vergelijkbaar met het kwaliteitsconcept van 
voortdurende kwaliteitsverbetering. 
 
De veiligheid van een organisatie kan worden verbeterd door het 
onderzoeken en corrigeren van processen die het gedrag op de werkvloer 
(“the sharp end”) bepalen. Fouten komen niet van zelf, maar ontstaan 
binnen de context van de werkomgeving. In deze werkomgeving zijn een 
aantal risico factoren aanwezig die aanleiding kunnen geven tot fouten 
maar die niet meteen in het oog springen. Daarom worden ze Latente 
Risico Factoren (LRFs) genoemd. LRFs dat zijn personeel, opleiding, 
communicatie, planning & coördinatie, ontwerp, onderhoud en 
beschikbaarheid van apparatuur, teamwork, team instructies, hygiëne, 
situationele awareness, hiërarchie en procedures. Onderzoek maakt 
duidelijk dat verborgen gebreken in het systeem de werkende mens in 
een positie kan brengen waarin ze fouten maken of ‘onveilig gedrag’ 
vertonen. Om de patiëntveiligheid te optimaliseren is inzicht in de kans op 
fouten en incidenten een belangrijke voorwaarde. Inzicht in de 
onderliggende oorzaken van onveiligheid maakt dat er gericht 
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verbeteren. Verbeteren van deze onderliggende factoren is meer effectief 
dan verbeteringen gericht op de directe oorzaken van fouten. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een overzicht van LRFs gegeven. De controle van 
elk van deze LRFs valt onder de verantwoordelijkheid van de organisatie 
en niet onder die van het individu. Daarom passen ze in een 
systeemgerichte benadering. Deze benadering staat in tegenstelling tot 
de persoonsgerichte benadering, waarin individuele prestatiematen, zoals 
vaardigheden of oplettendheid, centraal staan. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de ontwikkeling van de Leidse Operatie en Intensive 
Care schaal (LOTICS) beschreven als een instrument om proactief de 
onderliggende oorzaken van fouten te detecteren door het meten van 
LRFs. De schaal toont de sterke en zwakke punten van een organisatie, 
waardoor de mogelijkheid ontstaat van data gestuurde interventies. 
Veranderingen in de veiligheid kunnen daardoor worden gecontroleerd en 
de effecten van interventies worden geëvalueerd. Op dezelfde manier kan 
de LOTICS worden gebruikt voor vergelijking tussen ziekenhuizen, 
werkunits en disciplines. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een succesvolle implementatie van een 
veiligheidsprogramma in de operatiekamer beschreven. De gunstige 
verandering in LRFs: apparatuur/materiaal en personele bezetting, gingen 
gepaard met een daling van het totale aantal waargenomen (bijna)fouten 
en een daling van fouten in de betreffende categorieën. Dit type 
interventie heeft voordelen voor het personeel van een OK, omdat de 
veranderingen in de werkomgeving zichtbaar zijn en resulteerden in 




In hoofdstuk 5 worden de relaties tussen de Latente Risico Factoren 
(LRFs) en welzijn in anesthesieteams onderzocht. De resultaten geven 
aan dat arbeidssatisfactie, stress en intentie om te vertrekken vrij goed 
voorspeld worden door de LRFs. Belangrijk is dat deze bevinding 
aantoont dat ongunstige arbeidsomstandigheden niet alleen leiden tot 
mogelijke gevaren voor de patiëntveiligheid, maar ook een negatieve 
invloed hebben op stress gerelateerde uitkomstmaten. De meeste studies 
over veiligheidskwesties in de anesthesie hebben zich geconcentreerd op 
anesthesiologen, maar de resultaten van deze studie tonen aan dat om 
een valide beeld van de veiligheid te krijgen het hele anesthesie team 
hierbij betrokken moet worden. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 hebben we ons gericht op de invloed van de klinische 
omgeving (Operatiekamer vs. Intensive Care Unit) en disciplines op de 
scores op de LRFs. We zagen dat IC personeel (staf en 
verpleegkundigen) minder problemen waarneemt voor training, 
communicatie, team instructie en hiërarchie. Dit kan het gevolg zijn van 
een ander werkproces, in vergelijking met de operatiekamer. 
Anesthesisten en personeel van de OK hadden een gunstigere perceptie 
over ontwerp en beschikbaarheid van apparatuur dan die van de ICU. We 
vonden verschillen tussen disciplines op alle LRFs. We suggereren dat dit 
het gevolg is van verschillen in organisatie van werk en professionele 
training. De taken van de verschillende disciplines kunnen een verklaring 
zijn dat ze slechts een aantal aspecten, maar niet het gehele plaatje 
overzien. Daarom adviseren wij in het kader van veiligheidsprogramma's, 
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De proactieve identificatie van LRFs helpt bij het ontwikkelen van 
maatregelen om foutinducerende omstandigheden te voorkomen, voordat 
zij een bijdrage kunnen leveren aan letsel bij de patiënt. Interventies 
gericht op ongunstige LRFs zoals gemeten met de LOTICS kunnen 
patiëntveiligheid verbeteren. Dit proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat staf en 
medewerkers van afdelingen anesthesiologie, OK en ICU in staat zijn om 
deze tekortkomingen te signaleren, hoewel ze in waardering over de 
risico's verschillen. Ongunstige LRFs kunnen fungeren als stressoren op 
de werkplek en een negatieve invloed hebben op het welzijn van het 
personeel. De sleutel tot een gezonde werkplek is het beheersen van de 
tekortkomingen in de structuur van de werkomgeving. 
 
De bereidheid van het personeel te spreken over patiëntveiligheid is een 
belangrijk onderdeel van de veiligheid in de OK en ICU. Daarom is een 
cultuur van openheid van belang. We denken dat het versterken van het 
veiligheidsbewustzijn onder medewerkers een begin is om dit te 
realiseren. Dit kan het beste worden gedaan door de uitvoering van 
concrete en zichtbare verbeteringen. We denken dat indien personeel en 
staf de patiëntveiligheid binnen de OK en ICU een hoge prioriteit geeft dit 
uiteindelijk hen zal motiveren tot een grotere betrokkenheid bij en 
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